The Man with One Map

“Non confundar in aeternum.” This Latin phrase—”Never let me be confounded”—comes from Psalm 30:2 and Ambrose’s Te Deum. In my parable “The Man with One Map,” I use it ironically: as a caution against the very rigidity it seems to champion. To refuse ever to be confounded is to turn away from the facts, the bends, the contingencies of the world. When reality contradicts our preferred map, we face a choice: revise the map or insist the world is wrong. My parable follows a master cartographer who chooses his certainty, his facts, his reality, over truth itself—until the world teaches him otherwise. It is a story about the cost of ideological capture and the wisdom of holding our frameworks lightly, with humility. Every map we create is provisional. Wisdom begins not with denying the world’s power to confound us, but with acknowledging that power, and revising our maps when warranted.

πόλλ’ οἶδ’ ἀλώπηξ, ἀλλ’ ἐχῖνος ἓν μέγα

The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog one great thing.

—Archilochus, Fragment 201

“Non confundar in aeternum,” the cartographer muttered as he unrolled his chart upon the council table. He said it whenever someone questioned the authority of lines.

The map was exquisite: vellum washed with pale seas, ranges shaded as if they were slumbering beasts, towns stippled in careful ink. It bore a golden stamp of the Guild and a marginal note in the cartographer’s own fine hand: Ex universis legibus terrarum—From the universal laws of lands. He had made it in his youth, riding the marches with soldiers and surveyors, triangulating sun to steeple, steeple to hill. Kings had trusted it. Merchants folded it close to their hearts.

Now he was old enough to have students and adversaries, but not so old as to doubt the charter of his life.

The city had summoned a council because caravans were vanishing on the southern road. The map showed a simple passage between river and ridge, a straight corridor to the salt ports. Yet messengers returned late or not at all, and those who survived spoke of marsh and misdirection, of sudden fogs and roads that forked where no fork should be.

In the council hall, the cartographer smoothed the vellum and placed lead weights upon the corners. “The error,” he said with gentle authority, “lies not in the chart, but in your conduct. The road is straight. If your men lose it, it is because they stray. Cleave to the line.”

Across the table, a surveyor of lesser years cleared her throat. She carried a case stuffed with flimsy, oil-smudged sheets: tidal charts, sketches of fallen bridges, diagrams with dates scribbled in the margins.

“With respect,” she said, “the river moved.”

“Rivers do not move,” the cartographer replied, “except in the imagination of those who fear getting their boots wet. The river is here.” He tapped the braided blue with a well-tended nail. “The law of the land agrees.”

“The law was written when the old poplar still stood by the ford,” she said. “The poplar is now a stump, and the ford is a sink. The river took a bend during the spring floods and laid down a swamp where your corridor was drawn. The road you show is no road, but reeds.”

The guildmaster’s eyebrows rose. The cartographer, who taught that the shortest route was a moral as well as a geometric virtue, returned the stare unblinking. “Then drain the swamp,” he said, “or bridge it. The line remains. The task is to make the world fit its description.”

He won that day, as he often did. He was learned and calm, and his one map had become a kind of liturgy. “Non confundar,” murmured the clerks when they indexed the city archives. “Let us not be confounded.” The council funded embankments. Engineers hammered piles into the mud where the vellum demanded that firm ground should be. The road reappeared, for a season, and wagons creaked forward with their cargoes of wool and salt and rumors.

Then the road vanished again.

This time it was not the river, but men. A brotherhood of armed riders—some called them bandits, others privateers, others still “the new keepers of the peace”—began to charge a passage fee at the bottleneck where ridge pressed river. The cartographer disdained such contingencies. “Tolls are marginalia,” he said. “We do not redraw coastlines for the graffiti of pickpockets.”

But the brotherhood entrenched. The toll grew from coin to cargo, from cargo to tribute, from tribute to decree. They built a timber hall and planted banners along the ridge. By the winter’s end a priest had blessed them, and in spring a scribe copied their schedules onto parchment with the city’s very ink. What began as extortion acquired a rubric, a calendar, a seal.

“Shakedown gussied up as law,” muttered the surveyor.

“Law tames force,” replied the cartographer. “If wolves must exist, better they wear collars.”

“But whose collars?” she asked.

He did not answer. He had begun to feel an ache behind the eyes whenever she spoke.

In the taverns, men told a story—simpler than the truth and catchy as a sailor’s tune—about two travelers: a man with one map and a woman with many. They set out separately for the salt ports. He studied his single chart with monastic devotion. She carried a handful of scraps, some borrowed, some smudged by rain, some contradicting one another. He mocked her disorder privately and, when pressed, publicly.

The man with one map made excellent time upon leaving the gates, for every step he took confirmed his certainty. The woman lagged, stopping to ask her way, sketching fresh lines on her scraps, erasing others.

When he came to the place where the river had laid down its new will, he stepped forward into reeds and found the earth at once solid and treacherous, like old philosophy. He tested each step against the chart. Where the ground disagreed, he corrected the ground by fiat. When the reeds rose to his chest, he raised the chart higher lest it be wetted. The map stayed true—dry in his fingers—while the world soaked his bones. He declared this a triumph of principle.

The woman with many maps, meanwhile, hired a boat.

By late summer, the man with one map had reached the brotherhood’s hall. He read his charter to the toll-keeper, who listened with a polite boredom common among men whose reality includes rope. “The corridor is free,” the cartographer recited. “Ex universis legibus—by the universal laws.”

“Universals,” said the toll-keeper, and reached out a hand. “Pay the particular.”

The cartographer paid nothing. He appealed to the city seal, to the king’s commission, to the guild’s stamp, to the algebra of lines. The toll-keeper shrugged toward the timber hall and the men beside it who understood that a rope is a sentence and a coin is the clause that spares it.

The woman with many maps had joined a convoy two valleys over, where a miller’s cousin kept a bridle path the guild had never deigned to chart because the bends were spiteful and the gradients rude. The convoy moved at the pace of old songs, full of hesitations and reprises. They crossed under night through a pass where the stars punched cold pinholes in the sky, and someone—no one later agreed who—began to call the constellations by unfamiliar names that nevertheless led the feet more safely than the sanctioned titles.

When the woman reached the salt ports, she folded her scraps, added a new sheet, and sent a letter to the council: The road you fund is not the road your wagons take. Your line is an aspiration; your merchants follow possibilities.

The cartographer, at last returning to the city after having been relieved of his money, his dignity, and a fair measure of his certainty, found the surveyor waiting in the archive. She did not gloat. She brought him a jar of ointment for the bites the marsh had left upon his ankles, and a thin book of poems copied by a monk who loved rivers.

“This does not disprove the map,” he said hoarsely.

“Of course not,” she said. “It proves the river.”

That winter, the council convened again—not to condemn the cartographer but because the harvest had failed west of the ridge, and the city needed grain. There were three possible routes: the corridor (in theory), the bridle path (in practice), and a coastal voyage via the river (in hope). The guild argued for the corridor as a matter of jurisdiction and dignity. The merchants argued for the bridle path because they had mended its bridges with their own coin. The sailors—men from the salt ports who had come upriver to trade—argued for the voyage because they feared neither storms nor land clerks.

A philosopher of the town—one who had read widely of systems that claim to be universal—rose to speak. He praised the aesthetic beauty of the single chart, the vigor of the bridle path, and the enormous patience of the sea. He then said what made everyone scowl equally:

“Friends, the grain does not care which theory carries it.”

The cartographer felt the ache behind his eyes widen into a room. He looked down upon his vellum. The coastline had always been elegant, the hills chaste, the road a melody of certitudes. But for the first time he seemed to see, not the thing depicted, but the hand that had drawn it—the youth that had believed the crispness of ink could render the world obedient.

In the margins, a faint earlier line showed through where the vellum had been scraped and redrawn, a palimpsest of a road abandoned because the mathematics proved it suboptimal. He remembered the day: a peasant had told him of a spring beside that older line, where travelers might drink and horses lower their heads in gratitude. He had erased the spring with a cold clarity. A road was not a sequence of mercies; it was a rule.

“Bring me your scraps,” he said to the surveyor.

She blinked, uncertain whether he mocked her. He did not. He cleared a corner of the table and laid the flimsy sheets beside the vellum—the flood sketches, the tally of fallen poplars, the toll schedules copied from the brotherhood’s hall by a clerk with neat hands and no illusions, the sailors’ soundings, the miller’s cousin’s memory of the pass where the stars had strange names. One by one, he set weights to keep the restless papers from curling back into themselves.

“Now,” he said, “show me the world as it is endured.”

They worked through the night. The archivists brought candles and, later, broth. The surveyor corrected with a carpenter’s pencil. The cartographer used a silver knife to lift old ink without flaying the skin of the map. He learned where to leave a line tentative, where to mark a ford as variabilis, where to note in small script a spring, an inn with bread, a shrine before which fools and sages had both confessed their need for luck. He engraved upon the vellum the best-known extortions as if they, too, were features of the land—for what was law but a toll that had learned to write?

Near dawn, the guildmaster entered and stopped in the doorway, startled to see the one map begetting a family.

“You would surrender the authority of form?” he asked, half-sorrowing, half-accusing.

“No,” said the cartographer, without looking up. “I would surrender the pretense that form is the world.”

In the spring, the city sent for grain by two routes: along the bridle path that wound through the western valleys, and down the old straight road that now led to the river’s new course. There, wagons gave way to barges that followed the current to the sea, and ships that hugged the coast like prudent lovers brought back their cargoes from the salt ports. Both routes skirted the brotherhood’s tolls entirely, leaving their banners to flutter over an empty pass. By land and by water alike, the grain returned not because the council had chosen the correct theory of roads, but because they had chosen to reach the hungry.

The brotherhood along the ridge—now styling themselves wardens—sent a deputation to complain that the map had given their toll an air of legitimacy by drawing it as if it were a hill. The cartographer listened and replied, “Hills may be leveled, but only by a labor you have not yet met.” The wardens, hearing in this neither blessing nor threat but an accounting of how the world answers those who insist, returned to their timber hall and argued among themselves whether to become sheriffs or pirates.

Years passed. The cartographer’s students learned two ways of looking: first at the vellum, then out the window. They learned to mark on the chart the places where certainty thins, and to go there kindly. The surveyor left the archives for a time to ride with caravans, then returned to teach a course called On Bends.

People brought the map to their faces and breathed the scent of its animal skin and the ink that had turned from black to brown. They debated whether the marginal notes—those apologies to contingency—were betraying the purity of the art or saving its honor. They argued as citizens do: earnestly, with a stake. Meanwhile, the grain moved, the ships put in, the bridle path widened tread by tread of boots, and a new poplar grew by the new ford, which boys would someday mistake for the old. The river laid down another bend and reclaimed it; the city repaired; the wardens grew gray and learned to write better.

One late afternoon, the cartographer walked to the ridge alone. He carried no map. The light came slanting, rendering every furrow articulate. A boy was stacking stones beside the road into a little tower that would fall at the next good wind. The boy saluted, as children do when they sense they are seen. The cartographer nodded and passed on.

From the ridge he could see the bridle path like a thought the city had finally permitted itself to think. He could see the barges making their slow commandments along the river’s new grammar. He could see, far off, a white scrap that might have been a gull’s wing or a sail or a prayer.

He thought of the maxim he had repeated all his life—Non confundar in aeternum—and smiled at how, in the end, the only sure way not to be confounded is to admit, in time, that the ground is entitled to confound you.

When he returned to the archives, he took down the brass stamp of the Guild and pressed it into a blank corner of the vellum—not over a line, not over a named thing, but in a small open space, as if to confess that every map owes the world a margin.

Beneath the seal he wrote, in a hand that trembled more now than when he was a young man forcing springs to disappear: The law of the land is not the land. Use this to begin.

Beyond the One Map: Toward a Craft-Based Understanding of Human Inquiry

Modern scholarship’s great temptation—one that has often spilled into civic and cultural life—has been the pursuit of totality: to trace coherence from the disorder that followed revolutions, continental wars, and world wars, gathering fragments into systems that promised to restore meaning to the wreckage of history. Across disciplines—from medieval literary studies to economics, from art history to psychology—the twentieth century witnessed a striking convergence toward singular, systematic frameworks. Ernst Robert Curtius organized literature around recurring topoi;[1] Erwin Panofsky read art through iconographic programs;[2] Carl Gustav Jung distilled human experience into archetypes; and economists—whether Marxist or neoclassical (the dominant free-market orthodoxy, often traced back to Adam Smith)—sought universal laws governing production and exchange. Each claimed to reveal the deep structure beneath surface variation. Each, in claiming totality, shaded toward ideology—becoming, in some instances, rigid orthodoxy.[3]

This essay argues for another path: treat systematic frameworks as tools rather than truths; judge methods by the illumination they afford rather than by their doctrinal purity; and acknowledge the irreducible complexity of human phenomena. This is not relativism—some interpretations are demonstrably better than others. Rather, it is the recognition that inquiry dealing with meaning-making beings is fundamentally a craft requiring practical wisdom (phronēsis), not a science discovering exceptionless laws.

The Pattern of Capture

The mid-century turn toward formalism and structuralism did not arise by accident. Disciplines sought scientific legitimacy: systematic method, universal patterns, predictive power. The result was a proliferation of One Map systems.

In literary studies, New Criticism treated texts as autonomous formal objects; structuralists sought universal narrative grammars. Curtius’s monumental European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages catalogued the enduring armature of topoi that seemed to organize the Western tradition. In art history, Panofsky’s iconology promised the decipherment of hidden programs and symbolic orders, making artworks legible as texts within overarching schemas. In psychology, rival schools—psychoanalytic, behaviorist, cognitive—each claimed the key to the mind’s machinery; Jung added a transhistorical repertoire of archetypes as the psyche’s deep code. In economics, Marxism and neoclassical theory offered total pictures—historical materialism on the one hand; rational, utility-maximizing agents in equilibrium on the other—each confident that its lawlike structures governed the social world.

What these systems shared was the conviction that beneath diversity lay discoverable, general structures—topoi, archetypes, economic laws, narrative grammars. Master the structure and one could, in principle, explain everything within the domain. Deviations became error, noise, or “false consciousness” in need of correction.

Powerful incentives drove the turn. The prestige of natural science encouraged methodological mimicry. The chaos of revolutions and wars, whether on battlefields or in the life of ideas, created a hunger for stable foundations. Professionalization rewarded methods that could be taught, replicated, and certified. There was genuine intellectual exhilaration in finding patterns that seemed to recur across times and cultures.

The cost was equally great. Every framework, in sharply illuminating some aspects, systematically obscured others. The formalist who honed attention to technique missed history. The Marxist who foregrounded class dynamics missed irreducible symbolic or aesthetic meaning. The psychoanalyst who reduced motivation to the unconscious discounted deliberation and norm-following. The economist who modeled rational actors abstracted away meaning, culture, emotion, and power.

Worse, frameworks became tribal identities. Scholars and others did not merely use Marxist analysis or formalist reading; they were Marxists or formalists. To question the framework threatened belonging, status, and career. Method hardened into movement.

The Metacritical Turn—and Its Recurrence

By the 1960s–70s, reactions emerged. Poststructuralists such as Derrida and Foucault exposed the fissures and power-saturated operations of totalizing systems. Thomas Kuhn argued that scientific paradigms are historically contingent and periodically overturned.[4] Feminist and postcolonial critics showed how seemingly universal structures often encoded particular (male, Western) vantage points.

These critiques were clarifying. They revealed the politics of knowledge, the contingency of canons, the slipperiness of signification. Yet the tragedy is familiar: many of these movements reproduced the error they named. Poststructuralism ossified into an orthodoxy policed by jargon; feminist and postcolonial discourses fractured into camps, each claiming the right diagnosis; Kuhn’s paradigm talk became a ready instrument for dismissing unwelcome evidence (“that is just your paradigm”). The critics of ideology birthed new ideologies.

The recurrence is not mysterious. Academic, social, and political life rewards membership and defensible positions. Deep engagement breeds emotional investment. Intellectual communities cohere around shared tools, which then become badges. Psychologically, human beings prefer coherent worldviews; critiques of totality tend, over time, to totalize themselves.

The consequence is a landscape of warring camps, each armed with a schema, each convinced of its sufficiency, each systematically blind to what it excludes.

The Pattern Persists

The tendency has not abated. Contemporary scholarship, while more fragmented than the mid-century consolidations, continues to generate frameworks that, having illuminated genuine blindnesses, themselves become new orthodoxies.

In literary studies, identity-based criticism has made permanent contributions: revealing whose voices were systematically silenced, exposing how “universal human experience” often encoded particular (white, male, Western) perspectives, opening canons to previously excluded works, and showing how power operates through representation. These insights cannot and should not be reversed. Yet in many disciplines, identity analysis is in practice often treated as mandatory—as if race, gender, and colonial dynamics exhaust what makes literature significant. Aesthetic achievement, formal innovation, philosophical depth, or meanings that transcend identity categories risk dismissal as naive or complicit evasion. A tool that reveals crucial dimensions has become, in practice, the only lens deemed legitimate.

In art history, social approaches rightly challenged the fantasy of autonomous art divorced from material conditions. Examining how patronage, markets, institutions, and class relations shape artistic production has enriched understanding immeasurably. But when this insight hardens into orthodoxy, artworks risk reduction to mere symptoms of social forces—historical documents that could be replaced by period photographs without loss. What makes something art rather than illustration, what constitutes aesthetic achievement, why this painting rather than another—these questions become suspect, dismissed as formalist mystification.

In psychology, cognitive neuroscience has genuinely advanced understanding of how brain mechanisms underlie mental phenomena. Neuroimaging and computational models provide knowledge unavailable to earlier approaches, and any comprehensive psychology must integrate these findings. Yet when neural accounts claim completeness, they eliminate what phenomenological and psychodynamic traditions captured: what experience is like from the inside, how people create meaning, how culture shapes consciousness, and the reality of conscious deliberation. Persons become brains; intentions become activations; meanings dissolve into mechanisms.

In history, social history’s turn toward “history from below”—material conditions, ordinary lives, structural forces—corrected the great-man myopia of earlier approaches and revealed how the non-elite shaped events. This expansion of historical vision is irreversible progress. But the corresponding neglect of how individuals, ideas, and political decisions matter—how Lincoln’s choices, Robespierre’s rhetoric, or Empress Dowager Cixi’s interventions in succession and reform, which may be judged to have prolonged the Qing dynasty, hastened its fall, or proved irrelevant against structural inevitabilities—represents a new distortion. Agency disappears into forces; contingency into necessity.

In economics, behavioral approaches rightly demonstrate that people are not the perfectly rational calculators of neoclassical models. Incorporating psychology into economic analysis addresses real limitations. Yet these insights typically remain within the neoclassical framework as corrective patches rather than fundamentally reconceiving how culture, meaning, power, and institutions shape economic life. The model receives adjustments; the model’s adequacy remains unquestioned.

Each new framework sees genuinely what its predecessor missed. Identity criticism perceives exclusions that formalism could not. Social art history grasps material conditions that connoisseurship ignored. Neuroscience reveals mechanisms that behaviorism and psychoanalysis could only theorize. Social history captures structural forces that political narrative obscured. These are real advances, not fashions.

But each also misses what its predecessor saw—and tends toward its own totality despite beginning as correction. Identity criticism risks losing the aesthetic. Social approaches risk losing the artwork. Neuroscience risks losing the person. Social history risks losing agency. The tools that should be added to the kit instead displace previous tools.

What is not happening is accumulation—the steady building of a varied toolkit where new approaches supplement rather than replace useful older ones. A mature literary criticism would use identity analysis and formalist attention to craft and historical context and aesthetic response, depending on what the text requires. A comprehensive psychology would integrate neuroscience and phenomenology and social context and developmental history. The skilled interpreter today should command these multiple approaches—not choosing between them but deploying each where it illuminates. Exceptions exist: some cognitive scientists integrate neuroimaging with phenomenological reports; some art historians combine social analysis with formal attention; interdisciplinary centers occasionally foster genuine synthesis. But these remain minority practices, swimming against dominant institutional currents rather than exemplifying them. Whether such emerging synthetic approaches represent genuine accumulation or merely the next turn of the cycle remains to be seen. Meanwhile, disciplines continue to trade one narrow lens for another, each generation convinced it has finally escaped narrowness by adopting the current correction.

The pattern is structural, not accidental. Professional incentives reward sharp breaks over synthesis. Tribal dynamics require scholars to define themselves against predecessors, not as continuators. The genuine difficulty of using multiple frameworks simultaneously encourages retreat to single-method mastery. And every framework that proves illuminating in some cases tempts practitioners to apply it universally—if identity criticism works brilliantly here, why not everywhere? The cycle repeats: insight hardens into ideology; correction becomes constraint; the tool claims to be the only tool needed.

The Category Error

The deeper problem is categorical. Objects of natural science lack interiority. Molecules do not interpret norms, pursue purposes, or remember. For entities without meanings, general law is the right instrument.

Human beings, by contrast, are meaning-making creatures who simultaneously:

calculate and improvise,
follow scripts and invent norms,
respond to incentives and pursue ideals,
act from unconscious drives and exercise conscious choice,
inherit traditions and forge new symbols,
seek survival and cultivate gratuitous beauty,
are biologically constrained and culturally various,
experience wonder, fear, shame, delight, duty.

Any framework that captures only one dimension—economic calculation, unconscious motivation, cultural determination, biological drive—remains partial. The person buying bread engages in exchange, enacts identity, satisfies hunger, recalls childhood, manages anxiety, enjoys form and fragrance, and participates in a regime of power. No single map captures this simultaneity.

Disciplines that study such beings—history, anthropology, sociology, economics, psychology, literary criticism—are, at their core, interpretive arts. They require:

Judgment rather than algorithm,
Phronēsis rather than procedure,
Tacit knowledge learned by apprenticeship rather than fully codified rules,
Rule-following attunement that resists complete formalization,
Contextual sensitivity to what matters here,
Tolerance for ambiguity without surrendering evaluative standards.

Attempts to make these disciplines “scientific” by imposing formal models with universal reach typically expunge the very features that make human life human: interpretation, normativity, innovation, and freedom.

The Cartographer’s Lesson

A parable. A cartographer produces an exquisite chart—precise, elegant, guild-approved. When caravans disappear along routes the chart marks as clear, he blames the travelers. When rivers shift and roads become swamps, he demands that administrators “restore” the world to match the drawing. When armed men raise tolls at chokepoints, he dismisses them as “marginalia.”

Meanwhile, a surveyor carries rough packets: flood records, bridge failures, toll schedules, sailors’ soundings, fragments of local lore. She uses whatever map fits this terrain; when none suffice, she walks and looks.

The cartographer confuses map and territory. The surveyor knows every map is a partial, provisional tool. When the cartographer finally admits that “the law of the land is not the land,” he learns what the surveyor already knew: use maps to begin understanding, not to replace it.

This is the stance human inquiry requires. Marxist  or neoclassical analysis, formalist poetics, psychoanalytic interpretation, rational-choice modeling—each is a map that foregrounds some contours while backgrounding others. The live question is never “Which map is true?” but “Which map (or combination) illuminates this terrain?”

Toward Methodological Craft

What does it mean to approach inquiry as craft?

Instrumental Pragmatism
Judge frameworks by illumination, not identity. Ask: does this help me understand this event, text, institution, behavior? Elegance is not a virtue if it casts decisive features into shadow.

Cultivated Eclecticism
Not dilettantism, but disciplined familiarity with multiple tools. A craftsperson keeps a varied kit and knows enough of each tool’s capabilities and limits to deploy it skillfully. This is harder than mastering a single framework—it requires years of practice with multiple traditions—but complex phenomena demand it.

Contextual Judgment (phronēsis)
No algorithm selects the right tool. Judgment forms through experience with cases, by seeing many patterns and exceptions, by learning what usually works where—and when to break one’s own habits. This is wisdom in Aristotle’s sense: the capacity to deliberate well about particulars.

Humble Acknowledgment of Limits
Every account is partial. The most honest claim is: “This framework reveals these aspects; others remain for other tools; still others remain opaque.” This is not relativism—we can distinguish better from worse interpretations—but recognition that comprehensiveness is impossible.

Results-Oriented Assessment
Evaluate interpretations by their explanatory and revelatory power—by whether they clarify evidence, accommodate counter-instances, and guide action—not by ritual conformity to a method. A method that violates orthodoxy but illuminates is superior to one that adheres but obscures.

Integration of the Shadow
Jung reminds us that the shadow we deny returns to trouble us.[5] What is true of the individual psyche is true also of our frameworks: each casts its own shadow, and what is banished comes back in altered form. The economic model cannot banish meaning and power; the formalist reading cannot banish history; the ideological critique cannot banish beauty and grace.

This posture is professionally risky. It builds no monolithic school, resists catechisms, and is harder to teach than technique. Judgment developed through apprenticeship cannot be reduced to steps in a textbook. The approach offers no easy tribal home. But it is the only posture proportionate to the subject.

This is not promiscuous eclecticism. Disciplined pluralism admits tools only insofar as they illuminate evidence, survive scrutiny against counter-instances, and cohere with established knowledge. The craftsman does not grab random implements but selects from a kit assembled through rigorous training. Bad interpretations remain bad—not because they violate methodological purity but because they distort evidence, ignore context, or fail explanatory tests. The point is that these evaluative standards are substantive (does it illuminate?) rather than procedural (does it follow the right method?).

Bread, Briefly

Consider bread. The economist sees prices and allocation; the anthropologist sees ritual identity; the historian sees revolutions sparked by grain shortages; the psychologist sees memory and comfort; the political theorist sees power over grain as power over people; the nutritionist sees macronutrients; the phenomenologist attends to the experience of crust and crumb. Each lens discloses a real aspect; none exhausts the thing. The person buying or baking bread engages all these dimensions simultaneously—and more besides, including whimsy, habit, and ineffable preference—and yet retains a mystery and irreducible particularity even after comprehensive analysis.

If bread—daily, simple bread—eludes total capture by any single framework, what hubris imagines that a theory could comprehend a people, a polity, an epoch?

The Political Parallel

The same craft logic applies to political economy. The modern state is neither pure predation (libertarian fantasy) nor pure salvation (vulgar statism). It is at once:

necessary infrastructure for complex life,
a perennial object of capture by interests,
the guarantor of freedom through law and its limiter through coercion,
creator and creature of market relations,
supplier of public goods and vector of exploitation.

Markets, likewise, excel at coordinating dispersed knowledge in some contexts and fail dramatically in others. The craftsman’s question is never “state or market?” but “which functions, organized how, accountable to whom, balanced by which constraints, under these conditions?”

Statesmanship, like scholarship, is an art of fitting means to circumstances. The statesman confronting an economic crisis needs to ask: Is this a moment for market incentives? For regulation? For direct provision? For some combination? The answer depends on diagnosis, not doctrine. Different problems require different tools. Ideological commitment to a single framework—whether libertarian, socialist, or technocratic—produces the intellectual equivalent of using a hammer on every problem because hammers are the only tool one recognizes.

Lineage of Craft

This essay’s argument stands within a tradition of pluralist and anti-foundationalist thought, indebted particularly to Isaiah Berlin’s value pluralism, Richard Rorty’s pragmatism, and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics, though it extends their insights across a broader range of disciplines and grounds them more explicitly in craft epistemology.[6]

Accordingly, this methodological stance is not a novel invention, nor is it “anything goes” relativism. It has a distinguished lineage. Aristotle distinguished epistēmē (demonstrable knowledge of universals) from phronēsis (practical wisdom about particulars) and technē (productive craft).[7] The human sciences, in his taxonomy, require phronēsis more than epistēmē—judgment about what to do in this case, not deduction from general laws.

Michael Polanyi taught that “we know more than we can tell,” that crucial expertise is tacit and transmitted by apprenticeship rather than explicit instruction.[8] The master craftsman knows when the wood will split, when the dough has risen enough, when the argument needs qualification—not by applying rules but through practiced sensitivity that cannot be fully articulated.

Wittgenstein observed that rule-following is socially embedded; the application of a rule is not itself rule-governed all the way down. At some point, as he wrote, “my spade is turned”—we act not from further rules but from trained judgment within a form of life.[9] This is not arbitrary; it is how competence actually works.

Clifford Geertz urged “thick description” in anthropology: embedding action in the “webs of significance” people themselves have spun, rather than subsuming it under general theory. [10] His interpretive approach recognized that understanding human behavior requires grasping the symbolic meanings actions hold for participants—meanings that are locally constructed and resist universal formalization.

These thinkers did not advocate methodological anarchy. They articulated rigors appropriate to human subjects: the discipline of attending carefully to context, of learning through practice, of acknowledging the limits of explicit formalization, of judging particulars wisely rather than applying universal rules mechanically.

Conclusion: Use This to Begin

The point is not to abandon systematic frameworks. Marxist analysis, formalist reading, psychoanalytic interpretation, economic modeling—all can illuminate. The point is to resist turning tools into totalities, to refuse the ideological capture that confuses method with truth.

What is required is methodological humility joined to practical ambition: admit partiality while pressing for understanding by bringing multiple tools to bear. This yields no catechism, no resting place, no easy fellowship. It is harder than certainty. It is also more honest, and more fruitful.

The best we can achieve is not final answers but better questions; not perfect maps but skillful navigation; not total theories but hard-won wisdom. The work asks for judgment, experience, humility—and the courage to say, at the edge of understanding, that the phenomenon retains depths we cannot plumb and possibilities we cannot predict.

The law of the land is not the land.
Light and shadow arise together.
Every map owes the world a margin.

Use this to begin.


Notes

[1] Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983; first published 1953).

[2] Erwin Panofsky, Studies in Iconology: Humanistic Themes in the Art of the Renaissance (New York: Routledge, 2018; first published 1939). See especially “Introductory: Studies in Iconology,” 3-31.

[3] In principle, these approaches can serve as complementary tools—free market and Marxian analysis, for instance, each shedding light when applied together to an historical situation. Yet in practice, frameworks often ossify into rigid ideologies. Marxism once held this place in the USSR; neoclassical economics has increasingly assumed it in the United States. A striking example is Ohio’s 2025 mandate requiring all public universities to incorporate Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations into a three-credit American civic literacy course, alongside the Constitution, the Federalist Papers, Lincoln’s addresses, and King’s Letter from Birmingham Jail. See Ohio Revised Code § 3345.382 (2025).

[4] Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012; first published 1962).

[5] Carl Gustav Jung, “The Shadow,” in Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self, The Collected Works Works of C.G. Jung vol. 9, part 2, ed. and trans. by G. Adler & R.F.C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979; first published 1959). Jung argued that the shadow comprises those aspects of the psyche that contradict the conscious self-image and are therefore repressed or denied; when unacknowledged, the shadow returns in distorted forms, and psychological wholeness requires consciously integrating what has been excluded.

[6] Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009; first published 1979); Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Continuum, 1989).

[7] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI, 1139a-1142a.

[8] Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966), 4.

[9] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker, and J. Schulte (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009; first published 1953), §217: “‘How am I able to follow a rule?’—If this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my acting in this way in complying with the rule. / Once I have exhausted the justification, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: ‘This is simply what I do.’ / (Remember that we sometimes demand explanations for the sake not of their content, but for their form. Our requirement is an architectural one; the explanation a kind of sham corbel that supports nothing.)”

[10] Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” in The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973).