On the Abuse of Language: Three Small Examples

Language is too often abused in casual conversation, but even more so in the media, where precision ought to be observed with particular care. Former colleagues knew me to be exacting about language in drafts crossing my desk. Those drafts would return marked not for style, but for word choice. Words are not as interchangeable as many assume. They carry moral weight, legal consequence, and cultural implication that may not be immediately apparent. To treat them as fungible is to dull thought itself.

While reading a recent essay in The Economist (“Schumpeter’s Bonfire of the Elites: Jeffrey Epstein’s Ghost Will Not Be Easily Silenced”), that old habit of scrutiny reasserted itself. The impulse to edit was difficult to suppress. Three passages, in particular, illustrate how subtle imprecision can distort moral reality.

I. “Young Women”

The essay opens:

“When he was alive, Jeffrey Epstein relentlessly abused young women.”

Epstein’s first conviction arose from soliciting sex from a fourteen-year-old girl. The investigation that followed involved multiple minors, many of them high school students. The public record is clear: these were children.

To describe such victims as “young women” is misleading. It shifts the moral register. “Young women” suggests agency, maturity, even consent in the reader’s imagination. “Girls,” or “children,” would not. When minors are involved, euphemism functions as diminishment.

Language can wound twice: once in the act, and again in the telling. Accuracy here is not pedantry; it is fidelity—to fact and to victim.

II. “Meritocracy Made Them Powerful”

Later, in discussing the infamous “Epstein class”—the network of elites drawn into his orbit—the author writes:

“Meritocracy made them powerful, global markets made them rich—and now Epstein is making them reviled.”

The claim regarding meritocracy invites pause.

But one example: Public filings, including litigation involving JPMorgan Chase and the U.S. Virgin Islands, reveal not merely talent rewarded in open competition, but networks of privilege, tax incentives exceeding $300 million, waived monitoring requirements, political facilitation, and a dense web of personal relationships. Connections, patronage, regulatory indulgence, and institutional protection appear far more prominently than disinterested merit.

To attribute such power and wealth simply to “meritocracy” is to sanitize a far more complicated—and less flattering—reality. Words such as “network,” “patronage,” “access,” or even “self-dealing” may lack rhetorical elegance, but they better capture the structural features at issue with Epstein and those who fluttered about him.

When language flatters arrangements sustained by proximity and protection, it ceases to describe and begins to launder.

III. Free Markets and Capitalism

A third passage reads:

“The twin ideals of free markets and globalization have received a bad rap since the financial crisis of 2007–2009 (perhaps the only event to end more careers than Epstein).”

The parenthetical may amuse. The larger problem is conceptual.

Free markets and capitalism are not synonyms. A free market describes a system of voluntary exchange governed by price signals and competition. Capitalism, as historically practiced, encompasses a broader architecture: capital accumulation, corporate forms, regulatory frameworks, financial engineering, and—particularly in recent decades—large-scale leverage intertwined with state backstops.

The crisis of 2007–2009 was not the collapse of voluntary exchange. It was the implosion of highly leveraged financial instruments, moral hazard embedded in “too big to fail” institutions, regulatory capture, and risk privatized in gain yet socialized in loss.

To conflate free markets with the excesses of financialized capitalism is rhetorically efficient but analytically imprecise. It encourages rejection of one when the failure lay largely in the other. Surely an author for The Economist knows better even if most readers, especially in America, do not. He should be more careful than to reinforce ignorance and such linguistic collapse.

None of these examples is catastrophic in isolation. Yet taken together, they illustrate how easily moral clarity erodes when vocabulary drifts.

The choice between “girls” and “young women” alters the gravity of a crime.

The choice between “meritocracy” and “networked privilege” reframes responsibility.

The conflation of “free markets” and “capitalism” obscures structural cause.

Language is not decoration. It is architecture. When beams are mislabeled, the structure leans.

Precision is not severity; it is honesty. And honesty, in public writing, remains the first obligation.

Minnesota Winters

darkness descends, light abates
breath quickens, pulse skips
not clear—do we close our eyes or flee,
inhale, inhale, inhale, gasp, grasp, break the spell
rush of air, icy, thought commences,
but edges, shapes—the outline of what must be done,
or what we leave undone

Unstopped Ears

gnarled tensions herniate the public weal;
bone fractures—order collapses.

author of ill, known to all—
yet the surgeon will not cut.

the patient pleads—
will ears unstop?

Blaspheme

Lips spit: I am the chosen one. I am the way. I am law—
by force alone I shatter.

Men bow—dirty knees, tongues lapping gilt from the calf.

Sacrifice: tablets, inheritance, will.

The Catalan Principle: A Forgotten Standard for Financial Crimes

When I read The Independent article linked below, I immediately recalled what I call here, in my response essay, The Catalan Principle. The contrast seemed too telling to ignore. Although I do not, in truth, endorse the sanction discussed—certainly not in ordinary circumstances—the historical example provides a striking counterpoint to the modern rhetoric of punishment directed only at the powerless.

Medieval Catalonia—a principality within the Crown of Aragon, governed by its own Cortes and its own body of law—developed one of Europe’s most exacting systems for regulating bankers. This severe and unforgiving regime was born not of vengeance, but of a sober understanding of where real civic danger, and indeed real violence, actually lay. The legislators knew that a banker held the community’s life in his hands. A single failure of trust could ruin families, wipe out savings, and collapse the economic life of a city, indeed, a region. They therefore placed the full burden of responsibility on the man seated at the banker’s bench—the banca, the literal table or counter from which he conducted his trade and at which depositors entrusted him with their funds (the same bench that, when broken, gave us the word bankrupt).

Beginning in 1300, a banker was personally liable for every entry in his sworn journal, his entire estate pledged to his depositors. Should he fail, he was immediately proclaimed bankrupt and disgraced, then confined on bread and water until he made every injured party whole. In 1321, the Cortes went further: a banker who failed to repay his depositors—within one year for past failures, or immediately thereafter—was to be proclaimed bankrupt throughout Catalonia, beheaded, and his property liquidated for restitution. Most strikingly, the law added:

The sovereign may not pardon him unless his creditors have been fully satisfied.

No royal favoritism.

No political clemency.

No early counterpart to the corrupt presidential or gubernatorial pardons used to absolve wealthy offenders in the present era for their financial and other crimes.

This was not theoretical. In 1360, the banker Francesch Castello was beheaded in front of his own bench—the very table at which he had accepted deposits—after failing to repay those whose savings he held in trust. The medieval world understood that economic destruction is a form of violence, and that the most consequential harms are often inflicted by those with power, not by those without it.

Which brings us to idea voiced recently by billionaire Joe Lonsdale for a return to public hangings as a display of “masculine leadership.” His proposed spectacle targets the familiar objects of elite contempt: the poor, the desperate, the socially marginal. Crime, in his imagination, flows upward from the street, not downward from the boardroom.

But consider what a medieval-style code would demand today. If we applied the Catalan principle—that those who hold the wealth of others in trust bear the highest responsibility—we would direct our harshest penalties not at the powerless, but at:

executives who obliterate pensions through financial engineering,

bank officers whose decisions wipe out depositors,

corporate officers whose malfeasances and misfeasances devastate multitudes, in some instances, entire communities,

institutional leaders who destroy livelihoods while shielding their officers through legal artifice.

Would Lonsdale applaud that as “masculine leadership”? Or is his appetite for the gallows limited to those who possess nothing worth stealing?

The Catalan legislators understood something our own era too often obscures: the powerful commit the greatest harms, and justice serves the common good only when it restrains them first.

What Lonsdale demands is not justice but hierarchy—punishment downward, indulgence upward. The medieval world, in this case, was the more virtuous, the more honest. It placed the noose (or lowered the axe, as the case may be) where the damage was greatest: at the bench of the wealthy who had destroyed the lives of others, and it did not permit them to purchase their way out of accountability.

Source: Usher, A. Payson. (1943). The early history of deposit banking in Mediterranean Europe. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard university press, 239-242.