The Shimmering Absence: A Journey into Silence

Prefatory Thoughts

Meditations on the Divine Absence are not arguments in defense of an idea, nor essays in systematic theology. They are structured instead as a triptych—three panels that open onto one another, each moving closer toward silence. Their form is intentional: poetic, theological, and contemplative in turn. The sequence begins in language, passes through tradition, and ends in surrender. This is the apophatic path not only in theme, but in structure.

Apophatic theology—also called negative or via negativa theology—is often misunderstood as merely an assertion that “God is unknowable.” But more precisely, it is a spiritual and intellectual discipline: the repeated, reverent unmaking of what is known, not to assert nothing, but to refuse to make of God something.

In this spirit, Meditation I: On the Absence that Speaks begins in the poet’s voice, naming the absence and its effect upon the speaking soul. This first movement is evocative rather than doctrinal; it explores the human impulse to name the divine and the deep intuition that such naming always falls short. The language is paradoxical, metaphorical, reaching always beyond itself. It echoes the mystical poets and desert fathers who knew that silence is not the opposite of speech, but its completion.

Meditation II: The Theological Echo of Absence turns from the personal to the historical. It gathers the voices of mystics, theologians, and philosophers who have traced the contours of this absence in Christian tradition and beyond. The figures cited—Pseudo-Dionysius, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, Aquinas, and Eckhart—do not merely argue for God’s unknowability; they enact it, each in their own way, by gesturing toward the divine as that which exceeds every utterance. The inclusion of resonances from Jewish, Islamic, Hindu, and Buddhist traditions is not an attempt at syncretism, but a recognition that the apophatic insight is not the possession of one creed. It arises wherever human speech meets its limit before the sacred.

Finally, Meditation III: Return to Silence abandons even these authorities. It is not a conclusion, but a relinquishment. It does not aim to instruct, but to let go. It beckons the contemplative not to grasp, but to receive. Here, the structure itself participates in the theology: movement gives way to stillness, and knowledge is overtaken by being known.

This form—poetic, theological, contemplative—is not accidental. It enacts what it describes. If the meditations succeed, they do so not by persuading, but by inviting. Not by resolving tension, but by allowing the reader to abide within it.

The apophatic tradition does not speak because it knows; it speaks in tension with what it does not know, responding to humanity’s innate compulsion to fill the pregnant void that silence presents. These meditations, too, speak—but with trembling voice, always approaching silence, always pointing beyond themselves. What is offered here is not a theology of absence, but a theological absence: a space in which the divine may be known by not being spoken.

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Meditations on the Divine Absence

It is at a total remove from every condition, movement, life, imagination, conjecture, name, discourse, thought, conception, being, rest, dwelling, unity, limit, infinity, the totality of existence.” — Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, The Divine Names

Yet, humanity still strives, with its limited lexicon and limp imagination, to create a divinity in its own image, willing a revelation and incarnation, rather than a contemplation and dim remembrance.

Meditation I: On the Absence that Speaks

We speak because we must. Language, that trembling scaffold of sound and symbol, is all we possess. We speak even into silence. Especially into silence.

Yet there is a silence so profound that it is not absence, but plenitude—so overflowing that it undoes every category into which we might try to pour it. It is not stillness, but the void that cradles movement. Not darkness, but the blinding brightness before which the eyes of the soul must close to see. This is the silence from which Pseudo-Dionysius begins—not a silence that demands filling, but one that demands reverence.

Still, we strive. We sculpt idols from our need, chisel out theology from longing. We clothe the divine in flesh because flesh is what we know. We name it with sacred syllables, not because we have grasped it, but because we fear the void its namelessness implies. What is not spoken might vanish altogether. And so, we speak.

But the more we speak, the more the divine retreats—not in spite of our words, but because of them. Each utterance of “God” tightens the net of finitude around what is unbounded. Each metaphor, however noble, is a concession to the fear of absence. We say Father, King, Fire, Light, Love—and behind every word lingers the unspoken admission: This, too, fails.

Perhaps true reverence lies not in naming, but in un-naming. In the surrender of language. In the gradual peeling away of image and doctrine until only a single breath remains—then even that dissolves. What if the highest praise is silence? What if the only true theology is awe?

The mystic knows what the theologian forgets: that to encounter the divine is to be unmade. The intellect does not ascend the mountain; it is stripped bare upon its slopes. The soul does not grasp the flame; it is consumed by it. We do not see God—we are blinded by the sight.

And yet, paradoxically, it is in this surrender that the dim remembrance awakens. A faint echo from before thought. A memory not of doctrine, but of origin. The soul recalls—not in clarity, but in yearning—that it once knew what it now cannot speak.

This remembrance is not knowledge, nor even certainty. It is the ache of what lies just beyond the veil. It is the recognition that we are not merely ignorant of the divine, but that the divine is of a nature so wholly other that even our ignorance cannot frame it. We do not fail to reach it because it is distant, but because it is other. Not far, but utterly near in a way we cannot endure.

Let us then cease striving to form God in our image. Let us instead allow ourselves to be unformed in the presence of what cannot be named. Let the lexicon fall silent. Let imagination bend toward surrender. Let us enter not into proclamation, but into mystery.

For what is remembered dimly may be closer to the truth than what is shouted from the pulpit.

And in that quiet, perhaps we will find not answers, but presence—not revelation, but a shimmering absence that speaks more deeply than all our declarations.

Not a voice, but the space in which every voice dissolves.

Not a light, but the void from which all light bursts forth.

Not a god fashioned in our image, but the image effaced in the divine.

And yet, scripture speaks—haltingly, tremblingly—of the face of God.

Not to describe it, for none who have glimpsed it speak of its contours. Rather, they speak of what it did to them. Jacob limps away, renamed and remade (Genesis 32:22-32). Moses descends the mountain veiled, his face radiant with an unbearable light (Exodus 34:29-35). Isaiah cries woe upon himself, undone in the temple (Isaiah 6:1-5). The face is never rendered, only reflected—dimly, in the trembling of the one who beheld it.

Perhaps this is the truest vision: not seeing what God is, but undergoing what it means to see. To encounter the divine is to suffer a revelation that effaces more than it illuminates. The face of God is not a surface to be studied, but a mirror that cannot hold our image. In that gaze, the self dissolves. Identity falters. What remains is not understanding, but awe—perhaps even fear—not of punishment, but of proximity.

For this is the truth the literalists miss: that these metaphors are not evasions, but vessels of meaning. They point to a reality too radiant for our eyes, too intimate for our language. The face of God is not a face—but the boundary between presence and annihilation. It is where knowing ends, and being is remade.

So let us not strive to depict that face, nor name it, nor cage it in doctrine. Let us instead receive the wound of that encounter, the mystery that leaves us silent and changed.

There, in the shimmering absence, in the dim remembrance of what cannot be retained, may we dwell—not as those who know, but as those who have been known.

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Meditation II: The Theological Echo of Absence

The paradox stands at the heart of theology: to speak of that which exceeds all speech, to name the Unnameable. If the first meditation rested on the poet’s breath and the philosopher’s silence, this second seeks resonance in the historical voice—the voices that have, across centuries, affirmed that the deepest truths of the divine lie not in presence, but in absence. Not in description, but in reverent unknowing.

The Paradox of Theological Language

Scripture speaks of God walking in the garden, wrestling with Jacob, speaking from the whirlwind. And yet, it also insists: “You cannot see my face, for no one may see me and live” (Exodus 33:20). This tension—between intimacy and unknowability, between revelation and concealment—has never been resolved. Nor should it be. It is the fertile ground from which the apophatic tradition springs: the conviction that God is best approached not through affirmation, but through negation—not by saying what God is, but by peeling away all that God is not.

The tradition does not reject speech, but recognizes its limits. It affirms that the words we use—however sacred, however inspired—are at best provisional. The divine is not the sum of our highest attributes multiplied to infinity. It is not the perfection of being. It is beyond being.

Dionysius the Areopagite and the Language of Unknowing

No figure more clearly articulates this mystical approach than the one who calls himself Dionysius the Areopagite. Writing in the late fifth or early sixth century, and cloaked in the authority of the Athenian convert of Acts 17, the Pseudo-Dionysius shaped the path of Christian mysticism with profound subtlety. In The Mystical Theology and The Divine Names, he insists that God is “beyond being” and that the soul must ascend not into light, but into the “superluminous darkness” (ὑπέρφωτον γνόφον)—that paradoxical state where illumination comes through the surrender of conventional sight.[1]

His thought was deeply influential in both East and West, preserved and transmitted through Maximus the Confessor and John of Scythopolis in the East, and through John Scotus Eriugena, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas in the Latin tradition.[2]

Eastern Echoes: Gregory of Nyssa and the Divine Darkness

Long before Dionysius, Gregory of Nyssa laid the groundwork for apophatic ascent. In his Life of Moses, Gregory describes a spiritual journey that moves from light, to cloud, to darkness—the very image Dionysius would echo.[3] This threefold progression is crucial: first comes the light of initial revelation (Moses and the burning bush), where God appears accessible to sensory perception. Then follows the cloud on Mount Sinai, where visibility diminishes but presence intensifies. Finally, Moses enters the “darkness where God was”—not absence, but presence so overwhelming that it transcends sight altogether. The darkness into which Moses enters is the place where God is most truly encountered—not by sight, but by an ever-deepening desire that knows it cannot comprehend.

This theology of yearning rather than seeing marks the Eastern mystical tradition and shapes Orthodox understandings of theosis, or deification, as participation in the unknowable divine mystery.[4]

Western Currents: Augustine, Aquinas, and the Limits of Reason

Augustine repeatedly affirmed that God transcends human understanding: Si comprehendis, non est Deus (“If you understand it, it is not God,” Sermon 117).[5] Aquinas, despite his systematizing impulse, echoes this humility. In Summa Theologiae, I.12.4, he asserts that we know God only through His effects, and that every name we give to God is analogical, not univocal.[6]

Meister Eckhart, building on these currents, pushed the apophatic impulse to its limits. His sermons and tracts often flirt with paradox and negation: God is “nothing” because God transcends all categories. For Eckhart, spiritual maturity requires a radical unknowing that undoes the ego and renders the soul receptive to divine birth within.[7]

The Cloud of Unknowing

In fourteenth-century England, an anonymous writer composed The Cloud of Unknowing, a guide to contemplative prayer rooted in Dionysian insight. One must abandon all images, concepts, and thoughts, and enter into a “cloud” between the soul and God. Only love, not knowledge, can penetrate this darkness.[8] It is a work of profound simplicity and depth, reminding its reader that one does not think oneself into the presence of God—one surrenders into it.

Resonances in Other Traditions

This way of unknowing is not unique to Christianity. Across diverse religious traditions, we find remarkably similar approaches to ultimate reality as that which exceeds conceptual grasp. Maimonides, in The Guide for the Perplexed, insists that “the negative attributes of God are the true attributes: they do not include any incorrect actions or any deficiency whatever in reference to God, while positive attributes imply polytheism, and are inadequate,” that is to say, in his view, the only proper theology is negative theology.[9] In Hindu Advaita Vedānta, the concept of neti neti (“not this, not this”) methodically negates all attributes when speaking of Brahman, while Mahāyāna Buddhism’s Śūnyatā (emptiness) points to a reality beyond all conceptual construction.[10] Similarly, Sufi mystics in Islam approach the divine essence (dhāt) as that which remains utterly transcendent even in the midst of intimate experience.[11]

Modern Loss and Quiet Recovery

The Enlightenment ushered in clarity, system, and the elevation of reason—but at the cost of mystery. Apophatic theology waned, but never vanished. In the twentieth century, thinkers like Simone Weil, Karl Rahner, and Jean-Luc Marion reclaimed it. Weil wrote of a God who withdraws to make room for human freedom.[12] Marion spoke of the divine as a “saturated phenomenon” that exceeds conceptual containment.[13] Denys Turner has argued that apophatic theology is not mysticism as irrationalism, but the highest form of rational humility—a rigorous acknowledgment of reason’s proper limits that represents not reason’s defeat but its most disciplined expression.[14]

To Know by Not Knowing

The apophatic path is not a renunciation of theology, but its transfiguration. It affirms that the truest knowledge of God is found not in definition, but in reverent surrender. The journey is not upward toward clarity, but inward toward mystery.

And so, we return to the face of God—not as image, but as encounter. Not as object of knowledge, but as the wound of being known. The face that blinds, that transfigures, that effaces the self who dared to see.

Let us abandon definition, and embrace mystery. Let us release certainty, and receive wonder. Let us remember, in silence, that we have been spoken into being by one who will not be spoken.

And in that shimmering absence, may we dwell.

Having traced the contours of absence through the voices of tradition, we stand now at a precipice. The theologians and mystics have led us to the edge of language, to the boundary where systematic thought dissolves into contemplation. What remains when historical survey falls silent? What emerges when the scholar’s pen is set down? We must now set aside even our carefully constructed apophatic theology, for what we seek precedes all theology—the unmediated encounter between the soul and its ineffable source. It is to this final threshold—not of further analysis, but of return to the originating silence—that we now turn.

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Meditation III: Return to Silence

The mystics spoke from silence and returned to it. Dionysius, from the summit of negation, advised: “Leave behind you everything perceived and understood….”[15] Eckhart dared to pray, “God, rid me of God.”[16] The Cloud counseled love—not thought, not form—love, as the only bridge through the cloud of unknowing.[17]

Now, having wandered long the corridors of theology, hearing the echo of centuries articulate and retreat, we arrive again—not at conclusion, but at the beginning.

Not a god named, but the God who names us. Not knowledge possessed, but a presence that possesses.

Here, the face of God no longer terrifies, for it no longer requires our gaze. Here, the void no longer threatens, for it holds us, cradles movement.

We speak, then we fall silent. We learn, then we forget. We know, then we are known.

So let the scaffolding fall. Let the doctrine be devoutly forgotten. Let the fire of yearning burn away the scroll.

The divine remains—not in image or language, but in the hush after. In that hush, we dwell.

At a total remove from condition, we find rest. Beyond movement, we discover true life. Outside imagination, we glimpse reality. Beyond name, discourse, and thought, we are embraced. Past being, unity, limit, and infinity, we return.[18]

Remembered. Released. Still.

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Endnotes

The phrase superluminous darkness (Greek: ὑπέρφωτον γνόφον) appears in the opening lines of the Mystical Theology attributed to Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. The Greek text used here is drawn from Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca, ed. J.-P. Migne, vol. 3 (Paris: Imprimerie Catholique, 1857), 997–1000. This foundational paradox of apophatic theology—a darkness more radiant than light—expresses the Dionysian claim that the divine transcends all affirmation and is to be approached through reverent unknowing. For a general discussion of the development and transmission of this tradition, see Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine, Vol. 1, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100–600) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 225–230; see also Vol. 2, The Spirit of Eastern Christendom (600–1700) (1974), especially 32–39 and 215–219; Vol. 3, The Growth of Medieval Theology (600–1300) (1978), 51–58; and Vol. 4, Reformation of Church and Dogma (1300–1700) (1984), 234–238.
For a focused discussion of Pseudo-Dionysius’ apophatic theology in its patristic, philosophical, and reception context, see Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), esp. pp. 113ff. For an accessible English translation of the Dionysian corpus, see Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, trans. Colm Luibhéid, ed. Paul Rorem (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987). The three introductory essays in that volume offer important perspectives on the historical reception of the Dionysian tradition: Jaroslav Pelikan, “The Odyssey of Dionysian Spirituality,” pp. 11ff; Jean Leclercq, “Influences and Noninfluence of Dionysius in the Western Middle Ages,” pp. 25ff; and Karlfried Froehlich, “Pseudo-Dionysius and the Reformation of the Sixteenth Century,” pp. 33ff.
Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses, trans. Abraham J. Malherbe and Everett Ferguson (New York: Paulist Press, 1978).
On the concept of theosis in the Eastern Christian tradition and its grounding in apophatic theology—especially as developed by Pseudo-Dionysius and interpreted within Orthodox mystical thought—see Nancy J. Hudson, “Theosis in the Greek Fathers and Pseudo-Dionysius,” in Becoming God: The Doctrine of Theosis in Nicholas of Cusa (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 11–44.
Augustine of Hippo, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, Part III, vol. 4, Sermons 94A–147A, trans. Edmund Hill, O.P., ed. John E. Rotelle, O.S.A. (Brooklyn, NY: New City Press, 1992), Sermon 117, pp. 209-223.
Thomas Aquinas, The “Summa Theologica” of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 2nd rev. ed. (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1920), I, q. 12, a. 4.
Meister Eckhart, Selected Writings, trans. Oliver Davies (London: Penguin Books, 1994), 141-142. Meister Eckhart, in his sermons, presents a mature expression of apophatic thought through paradox and negation. For a representative example, see Sermon 52 in Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense, trans. Edmund Colledge and Bernard McGinn (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1981), 199ff; see also Bruce Milem, “Suffering God: Meister Eckhart’s Sermon 52,” Mystics Quarterly 22, no. 2 (1996): 69–90.
On the significance of The Cloud of Unknowing as a foundational text in the English apophatic tradition, see both Evelyn Underhill’s traditional rendering in The Cloud of Unknowing (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2012; originally published London: Stuart & Watkins, 1912), which preserves the texture of Middle English spirituality, and Carmen Acevedo Butcher’s modernized version, The Cloud of Unknowing (Boulder, CO: Shambhala Publications, 2009), which presents the text in accessible contemporary English. These complementary translations illustrate the dynamic between historical fidelity and modern readability in mystical literature.
For a classic treatment of negative theology within the Jewish philosophical tradition, particularly the limits of language in describing God, see Moses Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed, trans. M. Friedländer, 2nd ed. (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), especially Part I, chapters L–LXI. This edition reprints the original 1904 translation first published in London.
On the Hindu expression of apophatic insight, particularly the formulation “neti, neti” (“not this, not this”) found in Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 2.3.6, see Brihadaranyaka Upanishad: With the Commentary of Shankaracharya (Shankara Bhashya), trans. Swami Madhavananda (Kolkata: Advaita Ashrama, 1950), pp. 336–337. For the Buddhist articulation of emptiness (śūnyatā) in relation to apophatic thought, see Jay L. Garfield, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, trans. and comm. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), esp. pp. 281–282 n. 104 and p. 325 n. 126.
William C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-Arabi’s Metaphysics of Imagination (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), Chapter I, “The Divine Presence.” On the Sufi understanding of divine unknowability and the paradox of perception, see William C. Chittick, Sufism: A Short Introduction (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2000; ebook 2011), p. 42. Chittick cites Abu Bakr’s famed aphorism: “Incapacity to perceive is perception,” capturing the apophatic logic at the heart of Sufi mysticism.
On the notion of divine withdrawal (kenosis) and the tension between presence and absence in mystical theology, see Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, trans. Emma Crawford and Mario von der Ruhr (London: Routledge, 2002; originally published 1947), pp. 15 and 32.
On Jean-Luc Marion’s account of divine self-revelation as the paradigm of saturated phenomena, see Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), esp. pp. 234ff.
Denys Turner frames apophatic theology as a disciplined intellectual practice, emphasizing its philosophical rigor and alignment with rational humility. He challenges the notion that apophatic theology is synonymous with mystical experientialism or irrationalism—arguing instead that it is the highest form of rational thought acknowledging its own limits. His second chapter on Pseudo-Dionysius is particularly significant, exploring the tension between knowing and unknowing, and demonstrating that apophatic theology, while paradoxical, is a systematic approach to understanding divine transcendence. See Denys Turner, The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, trans. Colm Luibhéid, ed. Paul Rorem (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987) Chapter 1, Section 1, 135.
This prayer appears in Meister Eckhart’s German Sermon 52. Bruce Milem discusses its significance in his essay, where the line is as “Therefore I beg God that he make me empty of God,” see Suffering God: Meister Eckhart’s Sermon 52, Mystics Quarterly 22, no. 2 (1996), pp. 81ff.
Anonymous, The Cloud of Unknowing, Translated by Evelyn Underhill (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2012), Chapter 6: “He may well be loved, but not thought. By love may He be gotten and holden; but by thought never.”
This concluding paragraph deliberately echoes the epigraph from Pseudo-Dionysius’s The Divine Names, bringing the meditation full circle.

Incompetence and Buffoonery: The Threat to Democracy

Preface to the Reader

There was hesitation before I posted the essay below. Not for its merit, but for its timing. I wonder, truly, whether we have already passed the point of rupture—whether the buffoonery we witness in scandals such as Whiskeyleaks (the use of the Signal app by U.S. cabinet officials and others to discuss classified war plans) is not merely incompetence, but a smokescreen for something more deliberate, more calculated, and far more lethal. If the jesters, clowns, and buffoons distract, it may be only so that the knife may fall unnoticed. This essay, then, may read not as prophecy but as postmortem—or as warning flung desperately against a wind already turning. And yet, even still, I believe it must be said.

Note to the Reader

This essay is written not as a partisan screed, nor as a nostalgic lament for some imagined golden age, but as a meditation—part moral reckoning, part civic warning—on the condition of a republic that has allowed itself to descend into spectacle, incoherence, and institutional decay.

It is addressed to those who still believe that government, for all its failings, remains a public trust; that civic virtue is not an antiquated ideal; and that the health of a nation may be measured not merely in wealth or might, but in memory, restraint, and the character of its leaders and laws.

The tone is deliberately severe, for the times are unserious. The satire is not meant to entertain, but to unmask. Where irony sharpens, it does so to reveal truths that cannot be said plainly without losing their edge. And where the anger beneath the prose surfaces, it does so not in despair, but in the hope that the reader, too, is angry—and unwilling to become numb.

This is not a call to revolution, but a call to remembrance, to vigilance, and above all to responsibility. If the republic is to be rebuilt, it will not be by those who broke it, nor by those who profited from its breaking, but by those who, though weary, still believe it is worth the rising.

The Farce of Ruin: On the Buffoonery, Cowardice, and Consent that Endanger the Republic

It becomes difficult indeed to weigh if the republic is more greatly endangered by ignoble, incompetent lackeys such as now populate the greatest offices of state, appointed by the bitter, vengeful, demented, and oft confused and wholly arbitrary despotic personality that resides in the executive mansion, courtesy of the cult of resentment, hate, and fear, than it would have been had he appointed more able men and women to execute his whims and vices. For in one case, we face the farce of ruin—the slow, stumbling, ignoble unraveling of a once-proud polity into absurdity and impotence. In the other, we would face tyranny executed with precision, method, and perhaps permanence. Yet if there is any comfort to be found in chaos, it is this: incompetence leaves wreckage; competence might have left chains. But wreckage, at least, invites the labor of rebuilding—if the will, the memory, and the courage yet remain.

This is the bitter paradox of the present hour: that we may find ourselves grateful not for wisdom, but for the want of it; not for virtue, but for its absence. That the republic’s temporary reprieve lies not in the strength of her institutions nor the vigilance of her people, but in the vacuity and vanity of her despoilers. These are not statesmen in the Roman sense, nor even villains in the Shakespearean; they are caricatures—jesters costumed in stolen robes of office, bumbling through decrees, barking orders not out of conviction but impulse, devoid alike of strategy and shame. And yet, we dare not laugh too loudly. For every laugh chokes on the question: how long can a republic endure when the machinery of its survival is entrusted to hands unfit to hold it?

The Rise of the Cult: Resentment as Political Theology

Power, once grounded in consent and law, now derives its strength from a darker source: resentment. Not merely disappointment or disillusionment, but that deeper, more corrosive sentiment born of perceived humiliation, of grievance nurtured until it metastasizes into dogma. No longer content to reform what they claim to hate, the votaries of this new creed seek instead to destroy—to salt the fields, poison the wells, and tear down every institution that once restrained ambition with honor, and pride with duty.

This is not politics in any meaningful sense. It is theology by other means—a bitter creed that worships neither God nor country but the self, wounded and wrathful. Its high priests preach vengeance cloaked in patriotism, its sacraments are insult and spectacle, and its liturgy is grievance repeated endlessly, unexamined and unrelieved. To belong to this cult is not to believe in anything beyond the negation of others: the “elites,” the “experts,” the “traitors,” the “others”—those perpetual abstractions upon whom every failure may be pinned, every fear projected.

Thus, the executive, himself a totem of grievance, is not admired in spite of his vices but because of them. His incoherence becomes a form of authenticity; his cruelty, a mark of strength; his ignorance, proof that he is unsullied by the corruption of thought. This is the logic of the mob, sanctified and enthroned. It does not seek truth, only validation; not justice, but vengeance. And from such poison grows not a polity, but a pack.

The Machinery of Power: Incompetents in High Places

Once, high office required at least the semblance of merit—a capacity for governance, a grasp of statecraft, or, at the very least, the discretion to defer to those who possessed it. No longer. The new qualification is loyalty alone: loyalty not to the Constitution, not to principle or country, but to personality. And not even to a consistent personality, but to a flickering candle in a tempest—unstable, moody, and perpetually affronted.

Thus have the halls of government been peopled with jesters, flatterers, and feckless opportunists. Ministers of the treasury who do not believe in numbers, secretaries of education who scorn learning, envoys who sabotage diplomacy, and legal advisors who treat the law as a nuisance to be outmaneuvered rather than a structure to be upheld. Their résumés are padded with failure, their careers propped up by sycophancy, their ambitions tethered not to public service but to personal advancement through proximity to power.

Yet their greatest failing is not simply what they do, but what they permit. Their very mediocrity becomes the shield behind which greater abuses are concealed. For while the citizenry scoffs at the spectacle—the press conference gaffes, the mangled grammar, the contradictions piled upon contradictions—policy proceeds maliciously, cruelly. Freed from oversight, insulated by noise, the machinery grinds on: protections undone, laws abandoned, rights weakened, government dismantled, alliances broken. The clown at the helm distracts the gaze, while the bureaucratic knife goes unnoticed beneath the velvet tablecloth.

And in this lies the genius of institutional vandalism: not to destroy with one mighty blow, but to dull the blade slowly—through mismanagement, attrition, and the silent resignation of the capable and the firing of tens of thousands. A thousand small indignities, each one tolerable, each one dismissed, until the edifice no longer stands, and we wonder not when it fell, but how we failed to notice.

The Counterfactual: What If the Tyrant Were Wise?

One is almost tempted to breathe a sigh of relief at the chaos, for chaos is its own limit. A despot who contradicts himself hourly, who governs by whim and forgets his decrees by dusk, is a tyrant only in name. He may wish to rule absolutely, but lacking consistency, foresight, or discipline, he becomes instead a figure of grotesque parody—dangerous, yes, but disarmed by his very incoherence. We may survive him not because of our strength, but because of his weakness.

But imagine, if you will, the inverse: a tyrant possessed of intellect, method, and clarity. One who governs not in the service of ego but of vision—however malignant. One who surrounds himself not with cowed incompetents, but with men and women of ruthless efficiency, cold logic, and administrative precision. This is the tyrant history has known best. It is not the fool who builds the gulag or writes the blacklists, but the functionary with a plan, the theorist with a chart, the orderly mind untroubled by conscience.

Had our moment produced such a figure, how much swifter the erosion of liberty would have been! How much more subtle the theft of rights, how much more durable the machinery of oppression! The republic might not have looked so disordered—it might have seemed vigorous, decisive, strangely efficient. But beneath the appearance of control, the soul of the nation would have already been extinguished, its people transformed not into rebels or resisters, but into docile instruments of the state’s will.

The question, then, is no longer whether we are fortunate in our calamity, but whether we understand its nature. For fools can be replaced. But should a day come when their successors wear the same mask but wield it with purpose—then the hour will be far darker, and the laughter that once served as shield will curdle into silence.

The Theatre of the Absurd: Democracy as Entertainment

If the republic falters from within, it is not only because of those who hold the levers of power, but because of those who have come to see governance not as a civic duty, but as a form of entertainment. The forum has become a stage, the statesman a performer, and the electorate an audience demanding sensation. Nuance bores, compromise offends, and truth is a distant, flickering ghost—unwelcome and unprofitable.

In such a theatre, absurdity is not a bug but a feature. Every gaffe becomes a meme, every outrage a headline, every policy a subplot in an endless narrative of grievance and spectacle. The media, desperate to retain its vanishing grip on attention, ceases to inform and instead curates the drama—cutting, splicing, amplifying. The body politic is no longer a deliberative citizenry but a viewership conditioned to react, not to reason.

And what is the role of the elected official in this new dramaturgy? Not to lead, but to brand. Not to govern, but to trend. They issue not laws, but slogans. They trade not in facts, but in feels. Even their failures become assets, for in the logic of the spectacle, visibility is power, and infamy sells just as well as virtue—often better.

Worse still, even those who know the performance is a fraud feel trapped within it. To disengage is to surrender the stage to the most unscrupulous actors; to engage is to be complicit in a system that rewards noise over thought, allegiance over principle. This is the final genius of the absurd republic: to create a politics where participation itself feels degrading, and yet absence feels dangerous.

Thus the state becomes not a polity of free and deliberative people, but a spectacle of exhaustion. We scroll, we jeer, we despair. But rarely—too rarely—do we act.

The Fragility of Memory: When History No Longer Speaks

No tyranny begins as tyranny. It begins in the forgetting. A forgetting not only of facts or dates, but of the moral weight of precedent, the slow accumulation of civic wisdom, the lessons written in blood and ink by those who came before. When memory is intact, it serves as conscience; when eroded, it becomes convenience. We do not recognize the fall because we no longer remember what it was to stand.

Once, a statesman would rise in the chamber and quote Pericles or Lincoln, Cicero or Solon—not merely to adorn his speech but to anchor it in tradition, to draw from the well of republican virtue. Now, even such allusion is dismissed as elitist pedantry. The past is regarded not as a guide but as a burden, and history is reduced to a buffet of misremembered grievances, curated to flatter the resentful and indict the dead.

In this vacuum, lies grow bold. Fictions parade as fact, myths usurp monuments, and the record of what was is rewritten by those who benefit from what is. The archives decay; the historians, sidelined or silenced, speak to a shrinking audience. Memory becomes tribal, curated by algorithm and sentiment. The young no longer study the fragility of freedom because it is no longer taught. The old recall its price, but their warnings are heard as the mutterings of a defeated past.

And what, then, remains? A citizenry adrift—cut loose from history’s moorings, vulnerable to every charlatan with a flag and a grievance. The republic, in such a state, is no longer endangered by enemies at the gates, but by the silence within. Not the silence of censorship, but the quieter, more dangerous silence of indifference. The silence that follows when memory no longer speaks and no one cares to ask what it once said.

Wreckage or Rebirth?

It is tempting, when surveying the present wreckage, to surrender to despair—to believe that the republic, having stumbled so absurdly into decline, can never be set aright. The pillars have cracked, the roof sags, and the foundation seems to shift beneath our feet. But wreckage, for all its tragedy, is not the same as ruin. What has been shattered can, in principle, be rebuilt. The question is whether the will endures, and whether the anger now rising can be forged into resolve rather than simply rage.

For there is anger—mounting, justified, and no longer concealed. It grows not within the cult, but outside it, among those who have watched with clenched jaws as the instruments of governance were handed to buffoons and cowards, as the executive strutted and raged, as the political class bowed and curtsied, mumbling excuses, averting eyes, trading principle for position. And it is not merely the executive that earns their ire, but the entire edifice of acquiescence—a legislature that mutters indignation but funds the farce all the same; a judiciary that, cloaked in solemnity, too often validates the very abuses it ought to constrain. These are not neutral bystanders. They are collaborators by convenience, guardians turned ushers to a constitutional catastrophe.

And so the citizen watches, furious and exhausted, as the republic’s very stewards conspire in its diminishment. Yet this fury, though dangerous if left to fester, may still be redemptive if rightly directed. The task is not to lament the collapse of a golden age that never was, but to resist the entrenchment of a cynical age that need not be. The republic will not be saved by the institutions that failed to defend it, nor by the party machines that greased its fall. If salvation comes, it will be through memory rekindled, virtue rediscovered, and courage reclaimed—not in grand gestures, but in the hard, slow work of rebuilding what was squandered.

We stand, then, not at the end, but at a crossroads between farce fulfilled and tragedy averted. The clowns will fall—their nature guarantees it. But what comes next will not be dictated by their collapse. It will be shaped by those who remain: the watchful, the angry, the resolute. The question is not whether the republic can rise again, but whether we still believe it is worth the rising.

Feeling Blue: A Poetic Odyssey

A midnight musing on Homer, color, and the surprising emotional depths of a mistranslated god.

**Bust of Homer**
*Roman, Late Republican or Imperial Period*
Late 1st century B.C. or 1st century A.D.
Marble, likely from Mt. Pentelikon near Athens
Height: 41 cm (16 1/8 in.); Face length: 21 cm (8 1/4 in.)
Photograph: © Museum of Fine Arts, Boston

Night is the time for vagabond thoughts—those unbidden travelers who step lightly into the study, pull books from shelves, and whisper paradoxes. Last night, one such thought came cloaked in the deep hues of Homeric sea-mist. I opened Robert Fagles’ translation of the Iliad—a beloved companion—and there it was: “the blue-haired god Poseidon.”¹

Blue-haired? Homer, who never knew the color blue? Homer, whose “wine-dark sea” has puzzled and delighted classicists and poets for generations? What does it mean to be “blue” in a world that never named the sky’s hue?

In Homer’s Greek, Poseidon is called κυανοχαίτης (kyanochaitēs)—literally “dark-haired” or “dark-maned”—a word that evokes depth, darkness, perhaps the shimmer of polished lapis, but not “blue” as we know it.² The root kyanos gestures toward something darker, more elusive, tied to the sea’s unfathomable depths and the glossy mane of a wild horse. When the earliest Latin translators, like Andreas Divus, rendered this as caeruleis crinibus, they preserved the ambiguity: sea-dark, storm-shadowed, ancient.³

Fagles, however, chooses “blue.” Not sea-dark. Not dark-maned. But blue, direct and modern, emotive and luminous. It is a poetic choice, not a philological one. It is also a deeply modern one—for blue in English is not just a color. It is a feeling, a state of mind, a synonym for longing, for absence, for twilight thoughts and aching depths.⁴

And so I wonder: is Poseidon feeling blue? Or am I, reading him across three millennia, transposing my own midnight melancholy onto his immortal form?

Translation, after all, is never a mere transmission of words—it is a voyage of interpretation, laden with the cargo of culture and the ballast of the translator’s imagination. In choosing “blue,” Fagles draws a line not just from kyanos to blue, but from epic time to our own: where gods feel, and we, perhaps, are gods remade in language.

What is blue, then, but the poetry of absence? A color that Homer never named, yet whose shadowy presence haunts his lines like a dusk-lit horizon, always just out of reach.⁵

Homer. The Iliad. Trans. Robert Fagles, with Introduction and Notes by Bernard Knox. New York: Viking Penguin, 1990, p. 359, line 651. Poseidon is described as “the blue-haired god,” a poetic rendering of the Greek epithet kyanochaitēs (κυανοχαίτης).
Liddell, H. G., and Scott, R. A Greek-English Lexicon. Revised ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, s.v. “κυανός.” The word can mean dark blue, glossy blue-black, or lapis-colored, often evoking depth or obscurity.
Divus, Andreas. Homeri poetae clarissimi Odyssea et Ilias Latine redditae. Venice: 1537. Poseidon’s epithet is rendered as “caeruleis crinibus,” preserving the sea-dark imagery. See also Lewis, C. T., and Short, C. A Latin Dictionary. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879, s.v. “caeruleus.”
Berlin, Brent, and Paul Kay. Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. See especially their discussion of the absence of “blue” in early Indo-European languages.
Gladstone, W. E. Studies on Homer and the Homeric Age. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1858, vol. 3, pp. 457–468. Gladstone first drew scholarly attention to the limited Homeric color vocabulary and the curious case of the “wine-dark sea” (p. 490).

Toward an Unsaying: Contemplation of Faith in the Shadow of the Ineffable

A meditation on the limits of theological language and the mystery of the Divine, this contemplative essay explores apophatic mysticism, the inadequacy of creeds, and the symbolic power of maps—blending poetic introspection with a life lived in scholarship, service, and creative expression.

Virginiae Item et Floridae Americae Provinciarum, nova Descriptio.
Map by Gerard Mercator (1512–1594), Jodocus Hondius (1563–1612), and Hendrik Hondius (1597–1651). — **Virginiae Item et Floridae Americae Provinciarum, nova Descriptio.**
Map by Gerard Mercator (1512–1594), Jodocus Hondius (1563–1612), and Hendrik Hondius (1597–1651).
Published in 1623 by Hendricus Hondius, Amsterdam.
Image courtesy of the David Rumsey Map Collection, David Rumsey Map Center, Stanford Libraries.
Licensed under Creative Commons CC BY-NC-SA 3.0.

Raised within the Romano-Byzantine tradition—formed by both the Roman and Byzantine Catholic rites—I was shaped by a confluence of liturgical beauty, theological depth, and mystical reverence. From that upbringing, there remains not merely memory, but a lasting affection for the rhythm and substance of the faith of my youth. It is not simply a cultural inheritance, but a formative lens through which the sacred, the communal, and the mysterious first revealed themselves. Yet, it would not be accurate to describe my present stance as that of a lapsed Catholic, nor as an atheist, nor as one alienated from the Church. Alienation implies disaffection or estrangement born of expectation unmet or betrayal suffered. What remains is neither rejection nor rebellion, but something quieter and more reflective—a posture of reverent detachment that neither clings nor condemns.

Any attempt to articulate my position must begin by acknowledging the futility of articulation itself—at least in matters concerning the Divine. The belief that the Divine wholly exceeds the bounds of human comprehension and articulation grows only firmer over time. All creeds, revelations, and theological systems—however earnest or inspired—are, in the end, efforts to sketch with a cramped human lexicon and limited imagination that which lies beyond even the highest powers of conception. Far from illuminating the Divine, such efforts only obscure its immensity by imposing upon it our narrow symbols and forms.

Better to liken our theological endeavors to the drawing of maps—maps sketched by explorers who had never seen the coasts they sought to chart. Just as early cartographers filled the margins with dragons, saints, and imagined cities, we adorn the unknown with creeds, cosmologies, and commandments. These are sincere efforts, yet they more often reflect our hopes and fears than reveal any transcendent truth. The more intricate the system, the more seductive the illusion that the map is the territory. But the Divine is not a line upon a page. It is the sea beneath the sea monster, the silence beyond the compass rose, the continent whose very existence remains unknown. To name the Divine is already to misname it; to describe is to distort.

Such a perspective finds its truest expression in apophatic mysticism—the via negativa, the way of negation—a tradition articulated by Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, a Christian thinker of the late fifth to early sixth century whose writings permeate the Catholic tradition through the works of Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, and the Spanish mystics, reminding us that the path of unknowing is not a break from faith, but one of its most ancient and revered expressions. In this light, God is not wise, not good, not just, not loving—not because the Divine lacks these qualities, but because our highest notions of them remain shadows cast by a light we cannot behold. Whatever we say of the Divine, however conceived, the most faithful statement is this: our words fall short.

Even so, human beings remain kataphatic creatures as well—creatures who long to speak, to name, to worship, to relate. Thus arises a kataphatic-apophatic tension, a profound and permanent unease between the impulse to speak of the Divine and the recognition that all speech fails. Hymns, liturgies, cathedrals, and doctrines are all human responses to this tension—not to capture the Divine, but to reach toward it, however falteringly. These gestures deserve neither scorn nor uncritical assent. They should be honored, but held lightly, cherished as poems rather than mistaken for proofs.

This tension extends beyond the realm of theology into the very nature of being itself. In a moment of quiet reflection, I found myself asking: “Where is Am I?”—caught between breath and thought, a question turning circles in the hollow of my chest. Am I the echo, or the voice that trembles back? A fragment drifting through the hour, a flicker in the endless light, unsure if I was ever whole or if the pieces were ever mine to find. Such a question is not mere existential uncertainty, but a recognition that the self, like the Divine, eludes definitive capture.

No formal creed or written revelation authored by man commands my assent, however noble or inspired it may be. Faith is not placed in these constructions, though the sacred yearning from which they arise is deeply respected. They are echoes of an original voice no longer heard directly, outlines of a presence glimpsed but never grasped. Like the adornments on ancient maps, these expressions are beautiful and sincere, but they are not to be mistaken for the thing itself.

To some, this may resemble agnosticism, though that word has become burdened with meanings it was never intended to carry—meanings of indecision, skepticism, or apathy. What is expressed here is none of those. It is not a shrug of the shoulders, but a bow of the head. Not the silence of the indifferent, but of the reverent. Not ignorance, but a conscious unknowing—a sacred refusal to impose limitation upon that which exceeds all bounds. This is why I eschew agnostic labels in favor of mystical ones—for the mystic does not claim ignorance of the Divine but acknowledges that true knowledge of it transcends conventional understanding.

What remains, then, is a life lived in contemplation of the ineffable—a contemplation that finds expression through creative work. In poetry, music, and essay, I reach toward that which cannot be directly named. When I write of the “eternal now” where “yesterday, tomorrow, and today collapse,” or compose lyrics that honor Humilitatem Initium Sapientiae, I am not merely creating art but engaging in a form of contemplative practice. These creative acts serve as bridges, not only between myself and the ineffable, but also between myself and others who share this reverent space, regardless of their formal religious affiliations or φιλοσοφίαι (philosophies or wisdom traditions).

The path ahead is not marked by certainty but by awe, not by declarations but by listening. Mystery is not something to be solved, but something to be honored. Years of formal study—first in history and religious studies as an undergraduate, then as a teacher of both subjects, and later through a long career in civil rights law and public service—have only deepened the awareness that human systems, whether intellectual, doctrinal, or legal, ultimately encounter their limits at the threshold of the sacred. In this, the apophatic tradition offers a spiritual home—a dwelling place where reverence begins precisely where language ends. If there is a guiding light for such a path, it is humility—humilitatem initium sapientiae—not merely as a moral posture, but as a metaphysical necessity. That teaching, which echoes throughout Thomas à Kempis’ The Imitation of Christ, remains not only a personal motto, but a settled conviction: that wisdom begins when one ceases to pretend to possess it.

Near the staircase in my front hallway hangs an early map of the New World—an artifact I have long cherished. Its artistry is matched only by its courage, for it dares to depict what was not yet known. Near the region now recognized as Virginia and the Carolinas, a sea monster rises from the ocean’s depths, signaling peril or wonder—perhaps both. On the land itself, figures of “natives” stand, imagined by a hand that never walked those coasts. That map does not record the world; it records what the world dared to imagine. So, too, do our theologies populate the margins of metaphysical uncertainty with monsters and angels, commandments and visions. They are imaginative acts—sincere, flawed, luminous. And like that map, they are to be cherished not for their precision but for what they reveal of the human longing to reach into mystery with word and symbol, with ink and awe. In their earnest striving, they remind us: we are always sketching the edge of the unknown, even when we know we cannot cross it.

The Real Armageddon: Musk’s DOGE and the Dismantling of Public Trust

“If you read the news, it feels like Armageddon. I can’t walk past a TV without seeing a Tesla on fire,” Elon Musk said recently at a Tesla all-hands meeting. “I understand if you don’t want to buy our product, but you don’t have to burn it down. That’s a bit unreasonable.”¹

The quote is evocative—perhaps designed to stir sympathy. Yet it invites a measure of irony. While vandalism against Tesla properties is, of course, deplorable, it is neither as widespread nor as catastrophic as Musk, and biased media reporting, would have the public believe. Fewer than a dozen reported incidents—at Tesla dealerships or Supercharger stations—have resulted in fires, graffiti, or property damage. In nearly all of these cases, suspects have been arrested and charged.²

In a country of over 330 million people, where more than 200,000 vehicle fires and 500,000 structure fires occur annually,³ and where Florida and Texas alone report nearly 3,000 murders each year,⁴ these incidents—while serious—are statistically insignificant. What Musk decries as “Armageddon” is, in national context, a series of isolated acts that have been swiftly addressed by law enforcement.

Meanwhile, under Musk’s leadership of the Trump administration’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), far greater destruction is being wrought—not upon property and government subsidized business interests, but upon the institutions designed to serve the American people.

According to Reuters, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is expected to lose over 80,000 employees under DOGE’s efficiency plan.⁵ Already, this downsizing is disrupting vital services: clinics are understaffed, appointments are delayed, and mental health services—already under strain—are faltering.⁶

This is not bureaucratic “streamlining.” The VA currently serves over 18 million veterans,⁷ many of whom depend on timely and specialized care for physical and mental trauma, service-connected disabilities, and long-term support. Disabling this infrastructure in the name of “efficiency” is not neutral policy—it is institutional abandonment.

The Social Security Administration (SSA) has not fared better. Facing mandates to reduce its workforce by up to 50%, the SSA is bracing for a collapse in the timely delivery of services to more than 70 million Americans, including over 50 million seniors.⁸ Already, SSA field offices in major cities have shortened hours, laid off staff, and seen processing times for benefits skyrocket.

Federal workers have responded with urgency. In San Francisco and other metropolitan areas, SSA and VA employees have staged public protests, warning of the catastrophic impact these cuts will have on their most vulnerable clients.⁹ Their message is clear: public service cannot survive on ideology alone.

Thus, while Musk’s Teslas may burn in isolated incidents, the real fire is the one now consuming the administrative state (the means by which public servants deliver public services to the citizens they serve pursuant to laws passed by Congress). The irony is sharp. Musk’s complaint—“You don’t have to burn it down”—could just as easily be addressed to himself. If you do not like the structure or scale of government, you do not have to dismantle its capacity to serve. That, too, is a bit unreasonable.

What Musk labels as terrorism when directed at his private enterprise is tolerated—even celebrated—when inflicted upon public institutions. Yet the human cost of the latter is infinitely greater. The quiet collapse of service infrastructure—untelevised and untheatrical—is the more insidious disaster.

In the end, the real “Armageddon” may not be a vandalized Tesla on a TV screen. It may be the veteran denied timely access to urgent medical care. The senior citizen waiting months for a critical in-person meeting at a Social Security office. The single parent lost in a phone queue with no one left to answer.

These are not symbolic gestures. These are lives.

Notes

Pras Subramanian, “Tesla’s Elon Musk Holds Surprise All-Hands Meeting to Assuage Employees and Investors,” MSN Money, March 21, 2025.
New York Post, “Pam Bondi Announces Charges Against 3 in Tesla Attacks,” March 20, 2025.
National Fire Protection Association, “Vehicle Fires,” 2024.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States, 2021.
Reuters, “US Plans to Fire 80,000 Veterans Affairs Workers,” March 5, 2025.
Reuters, “VA Shake-up Disrupts Mental Health Services,” March 20, 2025.
Pew Research Center, “The Changing Face of America’s Veteran Population,” November 8, 2023; Reuters, “VA Shake-up Disrupts Mental Health Services,” March 20, 2025.
Sara Dorn, “Here’s Where Trump’s Government Layoffs Are,” Forbes, February 21, 2025.
San Francisco Chronicle, “Federal Workers Protest Musk-Led Government Cuts,” March 14, 2025.