The Shimmering Absence: A Journey into Silence

Prefatory Thoughts

Meditations on the Divine Absence are not arguments in defense of an idea, nor essays in systematic theology. They are structured instead as a triptych—three panels that open onto one another, each moving closer toward silence. Their form is intentional: poetic, theological, and contemplative in turn. The sequence begins in language, passes through tradition, and ends in surrender. This is the apophatic path not only in theme, but in structure.

Apophatic theology—also called negative or via negativa theology—is often misunderstood as merely an assertion that “God is unknowable.” But more precisely, it is a spiritual and intellectual discipline: the repeated, reverent unmaking of what is known, not to assert nothing, but to refuse to make of God something.

In this spirit, Meditation I: On the Absence that Speaks begins in the poet’s voice, naming the absence and its effect upon the speaking soul. This first movement is evocative rather than doctrinal; it explores the human impulse to name the divine and the deep intuition that such naming always falls short. The language is paradoxical, metaphorical, reaching always beyond itself. It echoes the mystical poets and desert fathers who knew that silence is not the opposite of speech, but its completion.

Meditation II: The Theological Echo of Absence turns from the personal to the historical. It gathers the voices of mystics, theologians, and philosophers who have traced the contours of this absence in Christian tradition and beyond. The figures cited—Pseudo-Dionysius, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, Aquinas, and Eckhart—do not merely argue for God’s unknowability; they enact it, each in their own way, by gesturing toward the divine as that which exceeds every utterance. The inclusion of resonances from Jewish, Islamic, Hindu, and Buddhist traditions is not an attempt at syncretism, but a recognition that the apophatic insight is not the possession of one creed. It arises wherever human speech meets its limit before the sacred.

Finally, Meditation III: Return to Silence abandons even these authorities. It is not a conclusion, but a relinquishment. It does not aim to instruct, but to let go. It beckons the contemplative not to grasp, but to receive. Here, the structure itself participates in the theology: movement gives way to stillness, and knowledge is overtaken by being known.

This form—poetic, theological, contemplative—is not accidental. It enacts what it describes. If the meditations succeed, they do so not by persuading, but by inviting. Not by resolving tension, but by allowing the reader to abide within it.

The apophatic tradition does not speak because it knows; it speaks in tension with what it does not know, responding to humanity’s innate compulsion to fill the pregnant void that silence presents. These meditations, too, speak—but with trembling voice, always approaching silence, always pointing beyond themselves. What is offered here is not a theology of absence, but a theological absence: a space in which the divine may be known by not being spoken.

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Meditations on the Divine Absence


It is at a total remove from every condition, movement, life, imagination, conjecture, name, discourse, thought, conception, being, rest, dwelling, unity, limit, infinity, the totality of existence.” — Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, The Divine Names

Yet, humanity still strives, with its limited lexicon and limp imagination, to create a divinity in its own image, willing a revelation and incarnation, rather than a contemplation and dim remembrance.


Meditation I: On the Absence that Speaks

We speak because we must. Language, that trembling scaffold of sound and symbol, is all we possess. We speak even into silence. Especially into silence.

Yet there is a silence so profound that it is not absence, but plenitude—so overflowing that it undoes every category into which we might try to pour it. It is not stillness, but the void that cradles movement. Not darkness, but the blinding brightness before which the eyes of the soul must close to see. This is the silence from which Pseudo-Dionysius begins—not a silence that demands filling, but one that demands reverence.

Still, we strive. We sculpt idols from our need, chisel out theology from longing. We clothe the divine in flesh because flesh is what we know. We name it with sacred syllables, not because we have grasped it, but because we fear the void its namelessness implies. What is not spoken might vanish altogether. And so, we speak.

But the more we speak, the more the divine retreats—not in spite of our words, but because of them. Each utterance of “God” tightens the net of finitude around what is unbounded. Each metaphor, however noble, is a concession to the fear of absence. We say Father, King, Fire, Light, Love—and behind every word lingers the unspoken admission: This, too, fails.

Perhaps true reverence lies not in naming, but in un-naming. In the surrender of language. In the gradual peeling away of image and doctrine until only a single breath remains—then even that dissolves. What if the highest praise is silence? What if the only true theology is awe?

The mystic knows what the theologian forgets: that to encounter the divine is to be unmade. The intellect does not ascend the mountain; it is stripped bare upon its slopes. The soul does not grasp the flame; it is consumed by it. We do not see God—we are blinded by the sight.

And yet, paradoxically, it is in this surrender that the dim remembrance awakens. A faint echo from before thought. A memory not of doctrine, but of origin. The soul recalls—not in clarity, but in yearning—that it once knew what it now cannot speak.

This remembrance is not knowledge, nor even certainty. It is the ache of what lies just beyond the veil. It is the recognition that we are not merely ignorant of the divine, but that the divine is of a nature so wholly other that even our ignorance cannot frame it. We do not fail to reach it because it is distant, but because it is other. Not far, but utterly near in a way we cannot endure.

Let us then cease striving to form God in our image. Let us instead allow ourselves to be unformed in the presence of what cannot be named. Let the lexicon fall silent. Let imagination bend toward surrender. Let us enter not into proclamation, but into mystery.

For what is remembered dimly may be closer to the truth than what is shouted from the pulpit.

And in that quiet, perhaps we will find not answers, but presence—not revelation, but a shimmering absence that speaks more deeply than all our declarations.

Not a voice, but the space in which every voice dissolves.

Not a light, but the void from which all light bursts forth.

Not a god fashioned in our image, but the image effaced in the divine.

And yet, scripture speaks—haltingly, tremblingly—of the face of God.

Not to describe it, for none who have glimpsed it speak of its contours. Rather, they speak of what it did to them. Jacob limps away, renamed and remade (Genesis 32:22-32). Moses descends the mountain veiled, his face radiant with an unbearable light (Exodus 34:29-35). Isaiah cries woe upon himself, undone in the temple (Isaiah 6:1-5). The face is never rendered, only reflected—dimly, in the trembling of the one who beheld it.

Perhaps this is the truest vision: not seeing what God is, but undergoing what it means to see. To encounter the divine is to suffer a revelation that effaces more than it illuminates. The face of God is not a surface to be studied, but a mirror that cannot hold our image. In that gaze, the self dissolves. Identity falters. What remains is not understanding, but awe—perhaps even fear—not of punishment, but of proximity.

For this is the truth the literalists miss: that these metaphors are not evasions, but vessels of meaning. They point to a reality too radiant for our eyes, too intimate for our language. The face of God is not a face—but the boundary between presence and annihilation. It is where knowing ends, and being is remade.

So let us not strive to depict that face, nor name it, nor cage it in doctrine. Let us instead receive the wound of that encounter, the mystery that leaves us silent and changed.

There, in the shimmering absence, in the dim remembrance of what cannot be retained, may we dwell—not as those who know, but as those who have been known.

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Meditation II: The Theological Echo of Absence

The paradox stands at the heart of theology: to speak of that which exceeds all speech, to name the Unnameable. If the first meditation rested on the poet’s breath and the philosopher’s silence, this second seeks resonance in the historical voice—the voices that have, across centuries, affirmed that the deepest truths of the divine lie not in presence, but in absence. Not in description, but in reverent unknowing.

The Paradox of Theological Language

Scripture speaks of God walking in the garden, wrestling with Jacob, speaking from the whirlwind. And yet, it also insists: “You cannot see my face, for no one may see me and live” (Exodus 33:20). This tension—between intimacy and unknowability, between revelation and concealment—has never been resolved. Nor should it be. It is the fertile ground from which the apophatic tradition springs: the conviction that God is best approached not through affirmation, but through negation—not by saying what God is, but by peeling away all that God is not.

The tradition does not reject speech, but recognizes its limits. It affirms that the words we use—however sacred, however inspired—are at best provisional. The divine is not the sum of our highest attributes multiplied to infinity. It is not the perfection of being. It is beyond being.

Dionysius the Areopagite and the Language of Unknowing

No figure more clearly articulates this mystical approach than the one who calls himself Dionysius the Areopagite. Writing in the late fifth or early sixth century, and cloaked in the authority of the Athenian convert of Acts 17, the Pseudo-Dionysius shaped the path of Christian mysticism with profound subtlety. In The Mystical Theology and The Divine Names, he insists that God is “beyond being” and that the soul must ascend not into light, but into the “superluminous darkness” (ὑπέρφωτον γνόφον)—that paradoxical state where illumination comes through the surrender of conventional sight.[1]

His thought was deeply influential in both East and West, preserved and transmitted through Maximus the Confessor and John of Scythopolis in the East, and through John Scotus Eriugena, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas in the Latin tradition.[2]

Eastern Echoes: Gregory of Nyssa and the Divine Darkness

Long before Dionysius, Gregory of Nyssa laid the groundwork for apophatic ascent. In his Life of Moses, Gregory describes a spiritual journey that moves from light, to cloud, to darkness—the very image Dionysius would echo.[3] This threefold progression is crucial: first comes the light of initial revelation (Moses and the burning bush), where God appears accessible to sensory perception. Then follows the cloud on Mount Sinai, where visibility diminishes but presence intensifies. Finally, Moses enters the “darkness where God was”—not absence, but presence so overwhelming that it transcends sight altogether. The darkness into which Moses enters is the place where God is most truly encountered—not by sight, but by an ever-deepening desire that knows it cannot comprehend.

This theology of yearning rather than seeing marks the Eastern mystical tradition and shapes Orthodox understandings of theosis, or deification, as participation in the unknowable divine mystery.[4]

Western Currents: Augustine, Aquinas, and the Limits of Reason

Augustine repeatedly affirmed that God transcends human understanding: Si comprehendis, non est Deus (“If you understand it, it is not God,” Sermon 117).[5] Aquinas, despite his systematizing impulse, echoes this humility. In Summa Theologiae, I.12.4, he asserts that we know God only through His effects, and that every name we give to God is analogical, not univocal.[6]

Meister Eckhart, building on these currents, pushed the apophatic impulse to its limits. His sermons and tracts often flirt with paradox and negation: God is “nothing” because God transcends all categories. For Eckhart, spiritual maturity requires a radical unknowing that undoes the ego and renders the soul receptive to divine birth within.[7]

The Cloud of Unknowing

In fourteenth-century England, an anonymous writer composed The Cloud of Unknowing, a guide to contemplative prayer rooted in Dionysian insight. One must abandon all images, concepts, and thoughts, and enter into a “cloud” between the soul and God. Only love, not knowledge, can penetrate this darkness.[8] It is a work of profound simplicity and depth, reminding its reader that one does not think oneself into the presence of God—one surrenders into it.

Resonances in Other Traditions

This way of unknowing is not unique to Christianity. Across diverse religious traditions, we find remarkably similar approaches to ultimate reality as that which exceeds conceptual grasp. Maimonides, in The Guide for the Perplexed, insists that “the negative attributes of God are the true attributes: they do not include any incorrect actions or any deficiency whatever in reference to God, while positive attributes imply polytheism, and are inadequate,” that is to say, in his view, the only proper theology is negative theology.[9] In Hindu Advaita Vedānta, the concept of neti neti (“not this, not this”) methodically negates all attributes when speaking of Brahman, while Mahāyāna Buddhism’s Śūnyatā (emptiness) points to a reality beyond all conceptual construction.[10] Similarly, Sufi mystics in Islam approach the divine essence (dhāt) as that which remains utterly transcendent even in the midst of intimate experience.[11]

Modern Loss and Quiet Recovery

The Enlightenment ushered in clarity, system, and the elevation of reason—but at the cost of mystery. Apophatic theology waned, but never vanished. In the twentieth century, thinkers like Simone Weil, Karl Rahner, and Jean-Luc Marion reclaimed it. Weil wrote of a God who withdraws to make room for human freedom.[12] Marion spoke of the divine as a “saturated phenomenon” that exceeds conceptual containment.[13] Denys Turner has argued that apophatic theology is not mysticism as irrationalism, but the highest form of rational humility—a rigorous acknowledgment of reason’s proper limits that represents not reason’s defeat but its most disciplined expression.[14]

To Know by Not Knowing

The apophatic path is not a renunciation of theology, but its transfiguration. It affirms that the truest knowledge of God is found not in definition, but in reverent surrender. The journey is not upward toward clarity, but inward toward mystery.

And so, we return to the face of God—not as image, but as encounter. Not as object of knowledge, but as the wound of being known. The face that blinds, that transfigures, that effaces the self who dared to see.

Let us abandon definition, and embrace mystery. Let us release certainty, and receive wonder. Let us remember, in silence, that we have been spoken into being by one who will not be spoken.

And in that shimmering absence, may we dwell.

Having traced the contours of absence through the voices of tradition, we stand now at a precipice. The theologians and mystics have led us to the edge of language, to the boundary where systematic thought dissolves into contemplation. What remains when historical survey falls silent? What emerges when the scholar’s pen is set down? We must now set aside even our carefully constructed apophatic theology, for what we seek precedes all theology—the unmediated encounter between the soul and its ineffable source. It is to this final threshold—not of further analysis, but of return to the originating silence—that we now turn.

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Meditation III: Return to Silence

The mystics spoke from silence and returned to it. Dionysius, from the summit of negation, advised: “Leave behind you everything perceived and understood….”[15] Eckhart dared to pray, “God, rid me of God.”[16] The Cloud counseled love—not thought, not form—love, as the only bridge through the cloud of unknowing.[17]

Now, having wandered long the corridors of theology, hearing the echo of centuries articulate and retreat, we arrive again—not at conclusion, but at the beginning.

Not a god named, but the God who names us. Not knowledge possessed, but a presence that possesses.

Here, the face of God no longer terrifies, for it no longer requires our gaze. Here, the void no longer threatens, for it holds us, cradles movement.

We speak, then we fall silent. We learn, then we forget. We know, then we are known.

So let the scaffolding fall. Let the doctrine be devoutly forgotten. Let the fire of yearning burn away the scroll.

The divine remains—not in image or language, but in the hush after. In that hush, we dwell.

At a total remove from condition, we find rest. Beyond movement, we discover true life. Outside imagination, we glimpse reality. Beyond name, discourse, and thought, we are embraced. Past being, unity, limit, and infinity, we return.[18]

Remembered. Released. Still.

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Endnotes

  1. The phrase superluminous darkness (Greek: ὑπέρφωτον γνόφον) appears in the opening lines of the Mystical Theology attributed to Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. The Greek text used here is drawn from Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca, ed. J.-P. Migne, vol. 3 (Paris: Imprimerie Catholique, 1857), 997–1000. This foundational paradox of apophatic theology—a darkness more radiant than light—expresses the Dionysian claim that the divine transcends all affirmation and is to be approached through reverent unknowing. For a general discussion of the development and transmission of this tradition, see Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine, Vol. 1, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100–600) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 225–230; see also Vol. 2, The Spirit of Eastern Christendom (600–1700) (1974), especially 32–39 and 215–219; Vol. 3, The Growth of Medieval Theology (600–1300) (1978), 51–58; and Vol. 4, Reformation of Church and Dogma (1300–1700) (1984), 234–238.
  2. For a focused discussion of Pseudo-Dionysius’ apophatic theology in its patristic, philosophical, and reception context, see Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), esp. pp. 113ff. For an accessible English translation of the Dionysian corpus, see Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, trans. Colm Luibhéid, ed. Paul Rorem (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987). The three introductory essays in that volume offer important perspectives on the historical reception of the Dionysian tradition: Jaroslav Pelikan, “The Odyssey of Dionysian Spirituality,” pp. 11ff; Jean Leclercq, “Influences and Noninfluence of Dionysius in the Western Middle Ages,” pp. 25ff; and Karlfried Froehlich, “Pseudo-Dionysius and the Reformation of the Sixteenth Century,” pp. 33ff.
  3. Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses, trans. Abraham J. Malherbe and Everett Ferguson (New York: Paulist Press, 1978).
  4. On the concept of theosis in the Eastern Christian tradition and its grounding in apophatic theology—especially as developed by Pseudo-Dionysius and interpreted within Orthodox mystical thought—see Nancy J. Hudson, “Theosis in the Greek Fathers and Pseudo-Dionysius,” in Becoming God: The Doctrine of Theosis in Nicholas of Cusa (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 11–44.
  5. Augustine of Hippo, The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, Part III, vol. 4, Sermons 94A–147A, trans. Edmund Hill, O.P., ed. John E. Rotelle, O.S.A. (Brooklyn, NY: New City Press, 1992), Sermon 117, pp. 209-223.  
  6. Thomas Aquinas, The “Summa Theologica” of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 2nd rev. ed. (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1920), I, q. 12, a. 4.
  7. On the significance of The Cloud of Unknowing as a foundational text in the English apophatic tradition, see both Evelyn Underhill’s traditional rendering in The Cloud of Unknowing (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2012; originally published London: Stuart & Watkins, 1912), which preserves the texture of Middle English spirituality, and Carmen Acevedo Butcher’s modernized version, The Cloud of Unknowing (Boulder, CO: Shambhala Publications, 2009), which presents the text in accessible contemporary English. These complementary translations illustrate the dynamic between historical fidelity and modern readability in mystical literature.
  8. For a classic treatment of negative theology within the Jewish philosophical tradition, particularly the limits of language in describing God, see Moses Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed, trans. M. Friedländer, 2nd ed. (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), especially Part I, chapters L–LXI. This edition reprints the original 1904 translation first published in London.
  9. On the Hindu expression of apophatic insight, particularly the formulation “neti, neti” (“not this, not this”) found in Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 2.3.6, see Brihadaranyaka Upanishad: With the Commentary of Shankaracharya (Shankara Bhashya), trans. Swami Madhavananda (Kolkata: Advaita Ashrama, 1950), pp. 336–337. For the Buddhist articulation of emptiness (śūnyatā) in relation to apophatic thought, see Jay L. Garfield, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, trans. and comm. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), esp. pp. 281–282 n. 104 and p. 325 n. 126.
  10. William C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-Arabi’s Metaphysics of Imagination (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), Chapter I, “The Divine Presence.” On the Sufi understanding of divine unknowability and the paradox of perception, see William C. Chittick, Sufism: A Short Introduction (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2000; ebook 2011), p. 42. Chittick cites Abu Bakr’s famed aphorism: “Incapacity to perceive is perception,” capturing the apophatic logic at the heart of Sufi mysticism.
  11. On the notion of divine withdrawal (kenosis) and the tension between presence and absence in mystical theology, see Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, trans. Emma Crawford and Mario von der Ruhr (London: Routledge, 2002; originally published 1947), pp. 15 and 32.
  12. On Jean-Luc Marion’s account of divine self-revelation as the paradigm of saturated phenomena, see Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), esp. pp. 234ff.
  13. Denys Turner frames apophatic theology as a disciplined intellectual practice, emphasizing its philosophical rigor and alignment with rational humility. He challenges the notion that apophatic theology is synonymous with mystical experientialism or irrationalism—arguing instead that it is the highest form of rational thought acknowledging its own limits. His second chapter on Pseudo-Dionysius is particularly significant, exploring the tension between knowing and unknowing, and demonstrating that apophatic theology, while paradoxical, is a systematic approach to understanding divine transcendence. See Denys Turner, The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
  14. Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, trans. Colm Luibhéid, ed. Paul Rorem (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987) Chapter 1, Section 1, 135.
  15. This prayer appears in Meister Eckhart’s German Sermon 52. Bruce Milem discusses its significance in his essay, where the line is as “Therefore I beg God that he make me empty of God,” see Suffering God: Meister Eckhart’s Sermon 52, Mystics Quarterly 22, no. 2 (1996), pp. 81ff.
  16. Anonymous, The Cloud of Unknowing, Translated by Evelyn Underhill (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2012), Chapter 6: “He may well be loved, but not thought. By love may He be gotten and holden; but by thought never.”
  17. This concluding paragraph deliberately echoes the epigraph from Pseudo-Dionysius’s The Divine Names, bringing the meditation full circle.


A Handful of Dust, A Handful of Light

Detail highlighting the dust motes from “Støvkornenes dans i solstrålerne” (Dust Motes Dancing in the Sunbeams, 1900)
By Vilhelm Hammershøi (1864-1916)
Oil on canvas, 70 cm × 59 cm
Ordrupgaard Museum. Photograph Public Domain.

Dust lingers in the ruins of empires, in the fading footprints of the past. It clings to the forgotten, settles upon the broken. T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land declares “I will show you fear in a handful of dust,” evoking a profound existential dread—the terror of insignificance, the finality of death in a world where nothing endures. Shelley’s Ozymandias presents the cruel irony that even the mightiest fall into dust, their ambitions erased by time. Shakespeare reinforces this democratic nature of mortality in Cymbeline, reminding us that: “Golden lads and girls all must, / As chimney-sweepers, come to dust” (Act IV, Scene 2). The biblical refrain, “For dust you are, and to dust you shall return” (Genesis 3:19) serves as a humbling reminder of human mortality—our bodies fated to mingle with soil and ruin.

This narrative of dust as dissolution has dominated our cultural consciousness for millennia. Yet beneath this interpretation lies a profound irony: the very science that revealed our cosmic insignificance also offers us a path to transcendence.

As we began to understand the origins of matter itself, a counternarrative emerged. The spectrographic analysis of stars, the discovery of nucleosynthesis, and the mapping of elemental creation within stellar lifecycles revealed an unexpected truth: the dust of our being is not merely the residue of life lost but the particulate remnants of stars long dead.

This scientific revelation transforms our relationship with dust. No longer just the symbol of our inevitable decay, it becomes evidence of our cosmic lineage. In this expanded understanding, we are made of elements forged in stellar cores—carbon, oxygen, nitrogen, iron—the ashes of ancient supernovae. As Carl Sagan elaborated: “The nitrogen in our DNA, the calcium in our teeth, the iron in our blood, the carbon in our apple pies were made in the interiors of collapsing stars.” (Cosmos, 1980)

The death of those stars gave birth to us. Thus, when our bodies return to dust, they are not returning to nothingness, but to the infinite. This is a poetic inversion of the traditional dread associated with dust. Instead of entropy as a reduction to meaninglessness, it becomes a return to something larger than the self.

Where Eliot shows us fear in dust, Carl Sagan tells us: “The cosmos is within us. We are made of star-stuff.” Lawrence M. Krauss echoes this sentiment: “Every atom in your body came from a star that exploded…. You are all stardust… the carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, iron …. They were created in the nuclear furnaces of stars.” (A Universe from Nothing, 2009)

The Paradox of Cosmic Fear

If one understands oneself as a finite being, bound to decay, dust is terrifying—it signifies loss. But if one understands oneself as an ephemeral expression of the universe, momentarily coalesced and destined to dissolve back into the great celestial flow, then there is no reason for fear. The end is not the end, but a return to origins.

So why does existential dread persist? Perhaps it is the ego’s reluctance to let go of selfhood. Perhaps it is the mind’s inability to accept that individual consciousness does not endure. Perhaps it is because dust, unlike stars, is silent. A ruined city, a forgotten name, a scattering of bones—all speak of oblivion, not grandeur.

As William Blake advised in The Proverbs of Hell, we “Drive [our] cart and [our] plow over the bones of the dead,” suggesting our instinctive fear of becoming that which is trampled and forgotten. Jorge Luis Borges captures this anxiety when he writes that “time is a river which sweeps me along, but I am the river”—we are both the eroder and the eroded, the dust-maker and the dust.

Yet, as a poem once attributed to Emily Dickinson but now considered of uncertain authorship reminds us: “Ashes denote that fire was; / Revere the grayest pile / For the departed creature’s sake / That hovered there awhile.” Dust does not truly vanish. It transforms.

Yet if the erasure of self is what we fear, we must ask: is selfhood truly lost, or merely transformed? If dust dissolves, does it vanish—or does it scatter into something greater?

From Dust to Light: The Redemption of Stardust

Yet if we understand dust not as an annihilation of self but as the very fabric of renewal, the fear dissolves. The metaphor itself must be rewritten: From dust we are made, from stardust we are formed. To dust we return, to the stars we return.

Walt Whitman intuited this cycle when he wrote: “I bequeath myself to the dirt to grow from the grass I love.” (Song of Myself, LII) His biological understanding of transformation prefigures our cosmic one—matter recycled through systems larger than ourselves.

If the metaphor itself shifts, then the meaning shifts with it. We do not fall into dust; we rise into radiance. We do not vanish into the void; we dissolve into the cosmos, as much a part of the next great supernova as we once were of the last. Even in knowing that we return to the stars, a quiet unease remains: what of the self? If I dissolve into light, is there still an “I”?

This cosmic transformation demands a new poetic language—one that recasts the traditional imagery of dust not as a symbol of loss but as a promise of renewal. If we are to truly grasp this shift in understanding, we must reimagine the very metaphors through which we comprehend our mortality. In the spirit of this reframing, I offer these verses that trace our journey from stardust to dust and back again:

From dust we are made—
  Not of earth, but embered light,
  Forged in stellar furnace bright,
  A whisper of stars in the cosmic shade.

To dust we return—
  Not to silence, not to loss,
  But scattered bright across the gloss
  Of galaxies that twist and burn.

Fear not the handful of dust—
  It is not death, nor mere decay,
  But embers cast upon the way,
  To rise once more in cosmic trust.

Thus, the fear in Eliot’s handful of dust dissolves when we see it not as an end, but as a beginning of something else. In the vast cosmic cycle, there is no finality—only motion, only transformation. The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam gestures toward this understanding when it speaks of being “Star-scatter’d on the Grass”—our elements returning to the cosmos from which they came. If all that we are, all that we love, all that we create ultimately returns to the stars, is that not immortality?

The Choice of Understanding

We return to the beginning, as dust does. The words of Genesis remind us: “For dust you are, and to dust you shall return.”

Yet now, having traced the journey of dust from earth to stars, we hear these words anew. Through the narrow human lens, we interpret them as a grim certainty—dust as ruin, silence, and the erasure of memory. We see only decay, the dissolution of self, the inevitable fading of all things into oblivion.

But through the enlightened cosmic lens, we recognize a deeper truth. Dust is not an end, but a transformation. It is not absence, but renewal. It is potential, energy, and the foundation of new worlds.

As Jorge Luis Borges reflects in We Are the Time:

“We are the time. We are the famous
metaphor from Heraclitus the Obscure.
We are the water, not the hard diamond,
the one that is lost, not the one that stands still.
We are the river and we are that Greek
who looks himself in the river.”

Borges, invoking Heraclitus’ ever-flowing river, offers a vision of existence as movement, dissolution, and renewal. We are not fixed, immutable beings; we are the water, ever-changing, ever-returning to the whole. If we are dust, then we are not the dust that settles, but the dust that travels—the dust that, like the stars, finds itself scattered only to be reshaped into something new.

To understand this is to grasp something beyond the immediate and the visible. It is to move past fear into recognition: that what was once bound into form returns to the vastness, not in loss, but in continuation. That what dissolves is not diminished but remade, part of a cycle stretching beyond human time. What Yeats called “a terrible beauty” is born in this transformation—terrible in its finality, beautiful in its cosmic potential.

Perhaps it is our task, then, to choose how we understand our own dust—not as the extinguishing of life, but as its return to the great fire from which it came. In this cosmic understanding, we are not merely dust returning to dust, but light returning to light—briefly kindled, then scattered again, not into oblivion, but into reunion with the luminous whole from which we emerged.


Schadenfreude and the Politics of Resentment: A Society Unmoored

The author reflects on a troubling societal trend where individuals derive joy from others’ misfortunes, particularly amidst widespread economic inequality. Instead of advocating for fairness, many focus on undermining those with minor advantages while overlooking systemic issues that favor the ultra-wealthy. Historical concepts like Nietzsche’s ressentiment underline this destructive mindset. The piece illustrates this with a union example, where members aimed to diminish benefits for others instead of promoting broader equity. The author emphasizes the need to redirect resentment towards addressing inequality, fostering solidarity rather than division, and calls for reclaiming virtues like justice and compassion in the face of collective suffering.

Throughout my life, I have encountered individuals and groups who seem to lack not only a moral and ethical compass but even a basic sense of self-interest. When they witness others losing an advantage—whether in employment, social standing, or opportunity—they do not respond with sympathy or concern but instead with unrestrained joy, reveling in another’s misfortune. Rather than advocating for fairness or seeking to improve society or their own standing, they take solace in the suffering of others, as though deprivation itself were a form of justice.

This perverse celebration of the misfortune of others becomes even more striking when we consider the actual distribution of power and wealth in our society. While workers resent each other’s minor advantages, America’s top 12 billionaires have amassed over $2 trillion in wealth—an increase of 193% since early 2020. The displacement of legitimate economic anxiety onto fellow workers, rather than the rigged systems enabling such extreme concentration of wealth, exemplifies how resentment is weaponized against collective interests. Instead of questioning the forces that have hollowed out the middle class, many find misplaced satisfaction in seeing others fall.

This phenomenon is not new. Philosophers and historians have long observed the destructive power of ressentiment—a term Nietzsche used to describe the corrosive, festering resentment of those who feel powerless, who, unable to elevate themselves, seek instead to bring others down (Nietzsche, 1887/1989, p. 36). The weaker spirit, he argued, does not strive toward greatness but seeks revenge against those who embody what it cannot attain. In our current dystopian era, where the richest 1% now control 54% of all stock market wealth—up from 40% in 2002—this sense of powerlessness has fertile ground in which to grow. Rather than demanding fairness or aspiring to something greater, many find solace in celebrating the stripping away the rights and relative advantages of others, while the true beneficiaries of systemic inequality remain untouched.

When the slide into the current era began, I began to see this corruption of the spirit play out in the most mundane of settings. Decades ago, in the workplace, I encountered a revealing example of the mindset that prioritizes resentment over solidarity. Our office had only a limited number of private offices and computers, with the former assigned to attorneys based on job classification and the latter distributed by seniority across all employees, including attorneys and investigators within the collective bargaining unit. When discussions arose about relocating to a new office space, the union sought input from the membership on concerns to bring forward to management. At the time—which was years before I became a supervisor—I was the local union steward.

To my astonishment, a significant number of members advocated for the union to ask management to eliminate private offices for all non-managers in the new space simply because not all job classifications had been granted them. Their logic baffled me. Rather than seeking to extend a benefit to more workers, they focused on stripping it from other bargaining unit members, as though incremental improvements in working conditions for some created intolerable working conditions for others.

Fortunately, I was able to argue—successfully—that this approach was entirely backward. Instead of resenting those who had obtained an improved working condition, we should advocate for an expansion of the working condition rather than its elimination. The rational course was to request that more job classifications be made eligible for offices, using objective criteria related to job duties and their similarities to those that already warranted offices. While we were ultimately unsuccessful in securing additional offices, we did succeed in shifting the mindset of the membership. What began as an impulse to strip others of their advantage out of frustration became, upon reflection, a collective effort to push for broader equity. We may not have won the tangible benefit, but we avoided the far greater loss of allowing ourselves to be divided by shortsightedness and resentment.

And yet, this very same ugly impulse now dominates our national discourse. The cruel celebration of public servants losing their livelihoods becomes even more troubling when viewed against economic realities. While many Americans cheer the human pain that the elimination of government positions and the middle-class existence which such positions enabled, the ultra-wealthy’s share of national wealth has reached levels not seen since the 1920s. Even more striking, as the oligarchs’ wealth share has nearly quadrupled since 1953, their share of total taxes has remained virtually unchanged. Yet rather than questioning this dramatic shift in resources, many find satisfaction in seeing their neighbors lose healthcare benefits and perhaps even their homes.

This misdirection of resentment has particularly pernicious effects along racial lines—an all-too-familiar pattern in American history. While the median Black family holds just 12.7% of the wealth of the typical white family, and 28% of Black households have zero or negative wealth, political entrepreneurs channel economic anxieties into racial antagonism rather than solidarity. The very communities that could benefit most from collective action are instead pushed toward celebrating each other’s losses rather than confronting the systemic structures that perpetuate their deprivation.

Even those who remain employed in federal service are subjected to arbitrary and senseless disruptions, yet their plight is met not with sympathy but with open derision. Some are forced to return to offices that lack the space to accommodate them, while others are ordered to relocate across the country to similarly ill-equipped workplaces—an absurdity greeted with applause rather than outrage. The schadenfreude is both bizarre and troubling, driven not by principle but by petty resentment: If I had to go back, so should they. I was never allowed to work from home, so why should they? I doubt they were even efficient in the first place.

These justifications are not arguments but thinly veiled expressions of bitterness, exposing a society conditioned to revel in the suffering of others rather than demand justice, fairness, or rational policy. Worse still, there is little recognition that these actions—these firings, transfers, program terminations, and other disruptions—whether arbitrary, capricious, cruel, irrational, intentional, or, at times, unfortunate yet necessary—inflict real harm on individuals with families and loved ones, embedded in communities not unlike our own.

This kind of envy serves only the interests of those who seek to keep us divided, distracting us from the real issues that demand our attention. Understanding the true scale of inequality—where most Americans’ wealth is tied to their homes while the top 1% controls over half of all stock market wealth—can help redirect resentment toward productive change. Rather than celebrating when others lose benefits or job security, we must recognize how the concentration of wealth and power benefits from our division.

This lesson has been articulated time and again by thinkers from across traditions. Aristotle’s concept of megalopsychia—the great-souled person—stood in contrast to those driven by pettiness and envy, emphasizing instead the nobility of advocating for the common good (See Book IV of the Nicomachean Ethics). In the Christian tradition, agape—a selfless, communal love—demands that one’s neighbor be uplifted, not torn down (1 Corinthians 13:4–7).

Yet in modern America, these lessons are too often ignored in favor of a corrosive, zero-sum mentality that pits the powerless against one another rather than against the forces that perpetuate their economic insecurity and often economic suffering. A society where 26-28% of Black and Latino households have negative wealth, while billionaires added over $2 trillion to their fortunes during a global pandemic, has deep structural issues to address. Yet instead of confronting these systemic challenges, we have allowed ourselves to be divided, finding hollow satisfaction in our neighbors’ misfortunes rather than building the solidarity needed for meaningful change.

This is the moral failure of our time—not just the overt corruption of those in power, but the willing embrace of cruelty by so many in the public. A nation that delights in its own suffering, that views the suffering of its neighbors as a victory rather than a tragedy, is one that has lost its way. The challenge before us is not merely political but fundamentally ethical: to resist the temptation of resentment and to reclaim the higher virtues of solidarity, justice, and shared human dignity.

Yes, there is a legitimate argument for addressing the national debt and curbing government spending. And yes, when Congress engages this issue in a constitutionally sound manner, it may result in job losses in the public sector. Such decisions, if undertaken with deliberation and fairness, may at times be necessary. However, what we have witnessed thus far is not a measured fiscal policy but a reckless, chaotic purge—carried out without regard for Constitutional norms, the rule of law, economic stability, or human impact. Even where reductions in government employment may be warranted, they should never be occasions for celebration, nor should they serve as fuel for the schadenfreude and politics of resentment that have become disturbingly and consistently prevalent.

Would that we had the wisdom to see it.


References

 Aristotle, and Terence Irwin. Nicomachean Ethics. 2019. 3rd ed., Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2019, https://www.perlego.com/book/4620092.

Nietzsche, F. (1989). On the Genealogy of Morals (W. Kaufmann & R. J. Hollingdale, Trans.). Vintage Books. (Original work published 1887).

LSE Inequalities. (2025, January 2). Ten facts about wealth inequality in the USA. London School of Economics and Political Science. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/inequalities/2025/01/02/ten-facts-about-wealth-inequality-in-the-usa/

The Symbolism of the Golden Plow in Literature

From William Blake’s Jerusalem, Chapter 3

How old is the literary tradition of the golden plow? This question arose unexpectedly while I was working my way through William Blake’s Jerusalem, where I encountered these striking lines:

They Plow’d in tears, the trumpets sounded before the golden Plow And the voices of the Living Creatures were heard in the clouds of heaven … (Blake, 1988, p. 205)

As often happens in literary exploration, the evocative image of the golden plow immediately diverted me from my primary task of continuing to read and understand Jerusalem. The golden plow, I realized, resonates deeply in our cultural consciousness, appearing not only in poetry (see also Blake’s Augeries of Innocence, where he writes: “When Gold & Gems adorn the Plow / To peaceful Arts shall Envy Bow”) but also in modern contexts—such as the Golden Plow Award, the highest honor presented to a sitting member of Congress by the American Farm Bureau.

The reasons for the golden plow’s enduring power as a poetic device are clear: the plow itself is a universal symbol of labor, cultivation, and renewal—an instrument that transforms barren soil into fertile ground, embodying humanity’s intimate connection with nature and the cycles of life. By portraying this familiar tool as golden, poets imbue it with sacred significance, elevating it from the mundane to the divine. Gold has long been associated with divinity, purity, and incorruptibility. In this sense, the golden plow often becomes not merely a tool of agriculture but a metaphor for spiritual or moral transformation, where the act of plowing symbolizes preparing the soul or society for renewal and growth.

This striking image led me to investigate its earliest literary appearances, which brought me to Herodotus’s Histories (late 5th century BC). In Book Four, he recounts the Scythian origin myth:

According to the Scythians, theirs is the youngest of nations, and it came into existence in the following way. The first man born in this land, when it was still uninhabited, was named Targitaos. They say that the parents of this Targitaos were Zeus and the daughter of the River Borysthenes, though that does not sound credible to me. Nevertheless, that is their claim. From such stock, then came Targitaos, and to him were born three sons: Lipoxais, Arpoxais, and the youngest of them, Colaxais. While they reigned, certain objects made of gold fell from the sky: they were a plow, a yoke, a battle-axe, and a cup. When these objects came to rest on Scythian ground, they were seen first by the eldest son, who, wanting to take them up, approached where they lay. But as he came near them, the gold caught on fire, so he left them there; and when the second son approached, the same thing happened. Thus the burning gold drove both of them away; but when the third and youngest son approached, the fire stopped burning and went out, so he carried the gold home, and the elder brothers reacted to this event by agreeing to surrender the entire kingdom to the youngest. (Herodotus, 2007, pp. 283–284)

While the specifically golden plow appears rarely in classical and medieval literature, the plow itself features prominently as a powerful symbol. In Virgil’s Georgics, the unadorned plow serves as both a practical tool and metaphor for poetic creation:

It must also be said what tools are the weapons of the hardy rustics,
without which neither could crops be sown nor harvests rise:
the plowshare and the heavy timber of the curved plow,
the slow-moving wagons of the Eleusinian mother,
the threshing boards, the sledges, and the rakes with uneven weight. (Virgil, 1846, Georgics I, lines 160–162, trans. by author)

Although Virgil’s plow is neither golden nor even gilded, its role as both a practical tool and poetic metaphor anticipates later literary uses of the golden plow as a symbol of sacred labor and creation.

The Jewish and Christian traditions, drawing upon their holy books, provided writers throughout the ages with rich sources of plowing imagery for metaphorical and allegorical purposes. Consider Luke 9:62, where commitment to discipleship is illustrated through the image of putting one’s hand to the plow; Amos 9:13, where the plowman overtaking the reaper symbolizes divine abundance and the promise of restoration; and Isaiah 2:4, where the transformation of swords into plowshares symbolizes divine peace. In these texts, the plow consistently signifies renewal, moral preparation, and divine purpose. This deep reservoir of symbolic meaning helps us understand the significance of Blake’s golden plow in Jerusalem.

In both Blake’s visionary poem and Herodotus’s historical narrative, the golden plow stands as a transformative symbol. For Blake, it is likely part of a cosmic act of redemption, accompanied by trumpets and celestial voices. For Herodotus, it conveys legitimacy and divine sanction within the founding myth of a nation. In each case, the golden plow bridges the earthly and the divine, elevating labor and effort to the realm of the sacred. This enduring image, rich with cultural and poetic imagination, invites reflection on how humanity’s most basic acts—plowing, cultivating, laboring—can become acts of profound spiritual significance.

That the symbol persists into our own time through awards like the Golden Plow Award suggests its continuing resonance with fundamental human values of cultivation, transformation, and excellence. Yet I wonder: might there be an even earlier literary reference to this powerful symbol than Herodotus’s account? Readers who know of earlier appearances are invited to share their findings.


References

Blake, W. (1988). The complete poetry & prose of William Blake (D. Erdman, Ed.; H. Bloom, Commentary). Anchor Books.

Ginsberg Project. (2024, October 14). William Blake – from The Marriage of Heaven and Hell – 14. Retrieved December 13, 2024, from https://allenginsberg.org/2024/10/oct14/ The Ginsberg Project has an interesting discussion of the Jerusalem extract which is the object of this post.

Herodotus. (2007). The landmark Herodotus: The histories (R. B. Strassler, Ed.; A. L. Purvis, Trans.; R. Thomas, Introduction). Pantheon Books.

Krisak, L. (2006). [Review of the book Virgil’s Georgics: A New Verse Translation, by J. Lembke]. Translation and Literature, 15(1), 111–113. Edinburgh University Press.

Lincoln, B. (2014). Once again “The Scythian” myth of origins (Herodotus 4.5–10). Nordlit, 33, 19–34.

The Jerusalem Bible: Reader’s Edition. (1968). Doubleday & Company.

Virgil (Publius Vergilius Maro). (1846). Georgica [Georgics], Book I, lines 160–162 (Hachette ed.). Translated by the author. Wikisource. Retrieved December 9, 2024, from https://la.wikisource.org/wiki/Georgica_(Hachette)/Liber_I

Virgil. (2005). Virgil’s Georgics (J. Lembke, Trans.). Yale University Press.

Finding Humility Through Montaigne’s Wheat Allegory

Photo by Pixabay on Pexels.com

One of the most striking images from Montaigne’s Essays, which has lodged itself firmly in my mind, comes from his Apology for Raymond Sebond. Specifically, within one paragraph, he uses wheat as an extended metaphor or an allegory wherein he suggests that the more wisdom or knowledge one acquires, the more humble one becomes. He writes:

To really learned men has happened what happens to ears of wheat: they rise high and lofty, heads erect and proud, as long as they are empty; but when they are full and swollen with grain in their ripeness, they begin to grow humble and lower their horns. (Montaigne, 1963, p. 227)

The image captures what I have found to be my experience insofar as that, with each passing year, as my hair has silvered and my eyes dimmed, I have found that wisdom requires casting the certitude, rigidity, and knowledge of youth aside for the humility of lived experience.  

Additionally, I find the lesson to be an extraordinary corollary to my personal motto, about which I have previously written, Humilitatem Initium Sapientiae (humility is the beginning of wisdom).

Thus, having reflected if not obsessed upon Montaigne’s insight for well over a fortnight, I finally shaped my thoughts about it into a poem, the results of which are below.


The Ripened Ear
(Inspired by Montaigne)

Beneath the sun’s unyielding gaze, it grows,
The tender stalk, upright and full of pride,
Its hollow strength unbent by winds that blow,
Yet void of fruit, it stands unsatisfied.

But time, the patient sower, bids it yield,
To weight of grain within its swelling breast,
It bows its head, as on the golden field,
The burdened ear finds wisdom’s humble crest.

So too the soul, in ignorance, stands tall,
Unbowed by truths it dares not yet to see,
Until the harvest’s gentle weight does call,
And bends the heart to find humility.

For wisdom ripens where humility’s sown,
And humbleness, by wisdom, is full-grown.


Montaigne, M. de. (1963). Essays and selected writings: A bilingual edition (D. M. Frame, Trans. & Ed.). St. Martin’s Press.